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ABSTRACT
This paper compares investor sentiment measures based on consumer confidence surveys with
measures extracted from the closed-end fund discount (CEFD). Our evidence suggests that these two
kinds of sentiment measures do not correlate well with one another. For a short 2 ￿4 year period in
which  we  have  direct  investor  sentiment  survey  data  from  UBS/Gallup,  only  the  consumer
confidence correlates well with investor sentiment. Further, only the consumer confidence based
measure can robustly explain the small-firm return spread and the return spread between stocks held
disproportionately by retail investors and those held by institutional investors. Surprisingly, there is
even a hint that the consumer confidence measure can explain closed-end fund IPO activity, while
the CEFD cannot. In sum, our evidence supports the view that sentiment plays a role in financial
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ivo_welch@brown.eduThe behavioral theory of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) predicts
that noise trader sentiment can persist in ﬁnancial markets. They argue that changes in
noise trader sentiment must be diﬃcult to predict to avoid arbitrage. Assets that are dis-
proportionally exposed to noise trader risk are both riskier and have to oﬀer an extra
return premium. In sum, the theory predicts that sentiment can inﬂuence security pric-
ing under two necessary conditions: [1] the assets are held predominantly by sentiment
(noise) traders, and [2] transaction costs are high enough to prevent systematic arbitrage
by arbitrageurs.
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), henceforth LST, ﬁrst explore the empirical implications
of this theory by assuming that noise traders are individual investors. Because individual
investors were already known to disproportionally hold closed-end funds (henceforth, CEF),
LST interpret the closed-end fund discount (henceforth, CEFD) as a (negative) sentiment
factor. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) then wring further implications and empirical sup-
port from this insight. Their most important implication is that decreases in the CEFD (i.e.,
more optimism) should be positively correlated with the returns of assets that are dispro-
portionally held by noise sentiment traders. LST identify the smallest decile of ﬁrms as
such. They ﬁnd that small ﬁrms outperform large ﬁrms when the CEFD decreases.
Although Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) discount other possible factors determining
the CEFD, ﬁrst and foremost agency (transaction) costs, they concede that multiple fac-
tors are likely to inﬂuence the CEFD. Ross (2005) explores these factors in more detail and
argues that transaction costs are more important than LST realized. In any case, the be-
havioral and the transaction cost views of the closed-end fund discount are not mutually
exclusive. Moreover, Spiegel (1997) and Berk and Stanton (2004) have recently proposed
a rational explanation for some of the time-pattern in the CEFD, although neither focuses
on the correlation between the extreme size decile return spread and sentiment.
Interest in the CEFD as a sentiment index has not waned. Indeed, Lee, Shleifer, and
Thaler (1991) has been a seminal paper, both in the novelty of its ideas and its subsequent
impact: as of March 2004, a quick citation search yields over 100 cites to it. A search in
SSRN shows that “investor sentiment” ﬁnds 53 matches, compared to 78 for the phrase
“APT.” If anything, investor sentiment has become a subject of more intense interest. The
CEFD remains the only widely used proxy of investor sentiment, and is itself a component
in some other measures of investor sentiment, though all of these have remained fairly
boutique.
Our own paper revisits the empirical evidence. We focus only on time-series sentiment
evidence, and borrow ideas and concepts from LST. But we can improve on the LST metrics.
First, our paper has an unfair advantage over LST—hindsight. That is, we can expand our
sample from 1985 to 2002 (16 more years), almost doubling the sample, which provides a
true out-of-sample test. Second, although sentiment is an abstract concept, we have what
we believe to be the best available empirical direct proxy for investor sentiment. It is one
2of the components in the Survey of Investor Sentiment conducted by UBS/Gallup. This
question asks respondents with savings and investments of over $10,000 the question:
I would like to ask you to think about the factors that could aﬀect the overall
investment environment OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS...how would you rate
performance of the stock market OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS?
The data also allows us to split respondents into investors with more than $100,000 and
less than $100,000 in wealth. We can exploit the UBS/Gallup survey to validate whether
or not other proxies correlate well with this measure of investor sentiment. Unfortunately,
the UBS/Gallup survey began regularly in 1999 and is only available in the United States,
limiting our ability to rely exclusively on it. Third, we follow LST in exploring the role
of investor sentiment on ﬁnancial market pricing, but we also explore whether the path-
ways through which consumer conﬁdence correlates with ﬁnancial markets are real (future
corporate proﬁts based) or ﬁnancial (investor preference based).
Our paper oﬀers three primary ﬁndings, each standing on their own:
1. We show that the CEFD is not a good proxy for investor sentiment. It has no correla-
tion with the direct UBS/Gallup measure (or other proxies of investor sentiment).
2. We show that the alternative candidate, consumer conﬁdence, is a reasonable proxy:
consumer conﬁdence changes correlate strongly with changes in the UBS/Gallup
proxy. That is, the two share a strong common factor, although they sample very
diﬀerent respondents. It is likely that they both pick up on the underlying factor—
investor sentiment.
3. We explore the impact of sentiment in ﬁnancial markets.
We ﬁnd that the CEFD has only reliably worked in Januaries in explaining small stock
excess returns even in the LST sample. Furthermore, it has not worked after 1985.
In contrast, consumer conﬁdence predicts small ﬁrm returns in non-January months
just as well as in January months. When we decompose changes in consumer conﬁ-
dence into a part that does and a part that does not correlate with present and/or
future consumption and corporate proﬁts, we ﬁnd that both help explain the excess
return spread between the two extreme ﬁrm-size deciles. Consumer conﬁdence also
does not diminish in importance if a contemporaneous measure of CEO conﬁdence is
included. Thus, the pricing inﬂuence of consumer conﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets is
not a phenomenon that arises exclusively through the predictive power of consumer
conﬁdence changes on future real economic conditions. There is mild evidence that
consumer conﬁdence changes have marginal impact on the returns of retail-held illiq-
uid stocks, holding ﬁrm-size constant, but this evidence is fragile.
Our consumer conﬁdence evidence is consistent with DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and
Waldmann (1990). It establishes a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for this behav-
3ioral perspective. Yet, absent precise quantitative theories of how sentiment should inﬂu-
ence ﬁnancial markets in an irrational-world perspective vs. a rational-world perspective—
so that we can attribute correlation that can be claimed by either perspectives exclusively
to one or the other—we cannot determine whether investor sentiment is an entirely behav-
ioral, irrational or a classical, rational phenomenon.
Our paper is similar to Lemmon and Portniaguina (2004), which is both contempora-
neous and independent. Our paper diﬀers in that our paper [a] relies on direct validation
via the UBS/Gallup proxy; [b] controls for diﬀerent macroeconomic factors; [c] predicts
returns with changes in consumer conﬁdence, not levels in consumer conﬁdence; and [d]
does not interpret the retail stock return spread evidence to be robust.
Our next section describes the closed-end fund discount and consumer conﬁdence,
and the theories behind their use. Section II describes the principal validation series, the
UBS/Gallup investor sentiment poll and the correlation of other proxies therewith. It also
addresses issues of bias, noise, investor identiﬁcation, and the diﬀerence between a direct
validation test and a theory-based joint hypothesis test. Finally, it discusses other proxies
of investor sentiment that we do not explore further. Our paper draws a sharp distinction
between this part, and what follows: an exploration of the inﬂuence of investor sentiment
on ﬁnancial market pricing in Section III. This section reexamines the LST evidence, decom-
poses the pathway through which consumer conﬁdence inﬂuences returns, and describes
why it is intrinsically impossible to separate the inﬂuence of investor sentiment into a ra-
tional and an irrational component. Section IV shows that exposure to sentiment is not
a priced factor in cross-section, and that sentiment itself is inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial
markets. After concluding in Section V, Appendix A oﬀers a FAQ that responds to earlier
referee reports.
I The Closed-End Fund Discount and Consumer Conﬁdence
Investor sentiment ranks among the most important theoretical and empirical concepts in
behavioral ﬁnance. To have meaning, it would seem essential to have an accepted proxy
for investor sentiment. (The alternative of attributing everything not explained by simple
rational models to sentiment would be a very weak test.) The closed-end fund discount
is the closest we have come to such a widely accepted measure. Other proxies, further
discussed in Section II.C, have remained “boutique.”
A The CEFD Measure and Theory-Based Validation
The Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) proxy for investor sentiment strongly relies on one
empirical observation and one theoretical hypothesis. The empirical observation is that
closed-end funds are predominantly held by retail investors. This is widely accepted. The
4theoretical conjecture is that the closed-end fund discount is driven by retail investor senti-
ment. Under LST’s theoretical conjecture, the CEFD becomes a proxy for investor sentiment.
This may not be the case, and for two reasons. First, there can be other factors that can
inﬂuence the CEFD and changes therein, for example transaction costs as noted by Ross
(2005) or time-varying liquidity premia and agency costs. Second, closed-end funds could
be disproportionally held by unusual retail investors (speciﬁcally, trust accounts), which
may not represent ordinary retail investors.
LST primarily base their validation on the correlation of the CEFD with the small-ﬁrm
decile excess rate of return.1 However, this can be criticized because it validates one ﬁnan-
cial measure (the CEFD) with another (decile stock returns). This makes it more likely that
both are driven by a ﬁnancial markets phenomena that are not yet fully understood. One
can further debate whether other regularities should be controlled away, or whether they
are integral. It could be that any other factor “steals” signiﬁcance from the CEFD precisely
because it, too, reﬂects investor sentiment. This was partly at issue in a well-known (and
amusing) exchange in the Journal of Finance in 1993. Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993) point
out that the correlation between the CEFD and the size spread declined in the latter half
of LST’s sample. They also ﬁnd that small ﬁrms with low institutional ownership have
similar coeﬃcients as those with high institutional ownership. In their rejoinder, Chopra,
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1993) respond that all small ﬁrms are generally noise-trader sen-
sitive with low institutional ownership, and that expecting to ﬁnd an eﬀect after splitting
subsamples again is asking for too much, thus imposing an incorrect null hypothesis.
In sum, the CEFD sentiment measure is a proxy that is based on the investor sentiment
theory itself. The tests then measure consistency of one implication of the theory (the
proxy extraction from the CEFD) with other implications (e.g., the rate of return on assets
disproportionally held by noise traders). To the extent that other costs can matter to the
CEFD (e.g., agency or fund fee costs), the CEFD proxy identiﬁcation with sentiment can be
weak. With both the test and the proxy based on ﬁnancial data—the CEFD is essentially
a book-to-market ratio—it is also relatively more likely that another theory (e.g., agency-
or liquidity-based) could eventually oﬀer an explanation for both ﬁndings, which could be
diﬀerent from investor sentiment.
1Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) also document that new CEF’s tend to appear in LST’s CEF data base
when investor sentiment levels are very positive, and that the CEFD on diﬀerent funds should be positively
correlated. When using the SDC data base, we could not conﬁrm more initiations of CEFs when investor
sentiment is high. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) can also hint that the theory is not inconsistent with a
negative CEFD upon fund inception, followed by a sharp drop from a premium into a discount, and then a
positive drift in CEFD reduction [to account for the need to oﬀer a positive expected rate of return]. However,
the dynamics are weak: the process by which the negative discount becomes positive is not clear, and we
are not aware of evidence that the CEFD systematically narrows over time.
5B CEFD Variable Construction
Both Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Ross (2005) generously shared their CEFD data
series with us; descriptions of their constructions can be found in their respective papers.
Our intent is to work with one long series, rather than with two separate series. Ex-ante,
both sources provide equally valid measures of the CEFD. Our only concern is that the
splicing (by averaging) the two series into one series could introduce a sharp discrepancy
that is calculation based, especially around the breakpoints.
For the 72 months in which we have both the Ross (2005) closed-end fund data and
the Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) data, the correlation between their value-weighted mea-
sures is 95%, The value-weighted regression coeﬃcients are
Ross CEFD Measuret = −0.21 + 0.973 · LST CEFD Measuret + Noiset . (1)
The correlation between the two sources’ equal-weighted CEFD measures is “only” 83%,
however. Nevertheless, this is comfortingly close to a one-to-one relation with a high R2.
The correlations actually seem remarkably high, given that there is no standard as to which
CEFs are included. Moreover, around the breakpoints where the two series overlap, we see
Month Ross LST Predicted Average
1980-01 16.96%






1985-12 2.10% 4.17% 3.85% 3.13%
1986-01 7.16%
Can we average the two series? The diﬀerence between the Ross and LST series has a
median of −0.30%, a mean of −0.44%, a standard deviation of this diﬀerence of +2.3%,
and an interquartile range of −1.95% to +1.34%. Further, the typical month-to-month
standard deviation for LST is 2.3%; for Ross 2.7%. Therefore, around the 1980 break, the
average of 17.31% diﬀers from the regression prediction of 18.13% by about 0.8%, which is
a discrepancy of about 0.36 extra standard deviations in the time series between using an
average and the prediction. The 1985 break point shows even less discrepancy. We also
conﬁrmed that none of our results is sensitive to omission of the observations adjacent to
the breakpoints.
We negate the CEFD so that according to the LST theory, it becomes a positive sen-
timent measure—we can then talk unambiguously about improvements (increases) and
deterioration (decreases). This measure is called bullish.cefd. We use the preﬁx “d.” to
denote the ﬁrst diﬀerence of monthly values, and the suﬃx “vw.” (“ew.”) to denote value-
weighting (equal-weighting). Therefore, our naming convention demands that we call the
ﬁrst diﬀerences in the negative of the CEFD d.bullish.cefd.vw and d.bullish.cefd.ew, for the
value-weighted and equal-weighted discounts, respectively. In subsequent tests, we rely on
6equal-weighted CEFD changes, because they tend to work better than value-weighted CEFD
changes.2 [Table 1]
[Figure 1]
Figure 1 and Table 1 give a feel for this data. The ﬁgure plots the time-series of CEFD and
its annual changes. The table shows that the typical d.bullish.cefd, both equal-weighted
and value-weighted, in our sample was around 0%. Drops in the CEFD in excess of −8%
occurred in March 1968, November 1976, and August 1998. Increases in excess of 7%
occurred in November 1967, January 1974 and September 1998.
C The Consumer Conﬁdence
Our proposed alternative proxy for investor sentiment, the consumer conﬁdence, relies
less on the sentiment theory and ﬁnancial measures itself, but seeks to identify the proxy
from direct survey questions.
Intrinsically, consumer conﬁdence seems to be a concept similar to investor sentiment.
Many investors are likely to be bullish about the economy when they are bullish about the
stock market and vice-versa. To qualify as a proxy for investor sentiment, consumer conﬁ-
dence and investor sentiment must be positively correlated. Thus, a maintained—and later
tested—hypothesis is that general exuberance would translate into both consumption and
investment optimism. In the context of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990),
the consumer conﬁdence measure further requires an identiﬁcation of consumers as the
individual retail investors that are the relevant noise traders—or, more accurately, that the
important marginal sentiment noise investors feel and act like the sampled consumers. We
can not fully identify the abstract theoretical concepts, but we can examine the correlation
among randomly chosen investors sampled in the UBS/Gallup survey (to see if there is a
common factor across individuals), we can look only at the subset of relatively wealthy in-
vestors among the UBS/Gallup investors, and we can correlate changes in the UBS/Gallup
measure with changes in consumer conﬁdence. In sum, although the survey-based con-
sumer conﬁdence index is not without drawbacks as an investor sentiment measure, it
does rely on two auxiliary hypotheses. Fortunately, we have the ability to directly corre-
late consumer conﬁdence (and other hypothesized investor sentiment measures) with the
UBS/Gallup proxy for investor sentiment to test these hypotheses.
2We also tried whitening the series. The following model ﬁt best:
d.bullish.cefd.ewt = −0.256 + −0.262 · d.bullish.cefd.ewt−1 + −0.0961 · d.bullish.cefd.ew t−2
R
2
= 7.9% (T= −1.67) (T= −5.48) (T= −2.03)
+ −0.031 · bullish.cefd.ewt−1 + noiset
(T= −2.22)
The R-square is moderate, but signiﬁcant. All results in the paper are robust to using the whitened or the
plain diﬀerence series. For comparability with LST, our paper relies on the latter.
7D The Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index
Our paper relies primarily on the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index, provided by the
Michigan Consumer Research Center.3 Post-1978, it is released monthly, enjoys great
prominence, and is available from the vendor. Quarterly data from 1952 to 1977 is avail-
able as series UMCSENT1 from FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data). For these months,
we interpolated linearly. Interpolating reduces the power of the consumer conﬁdence (CC)
measure, but the results remain stable if we ignore the quarterly data (as we do in our
post-1985 subsamples). The following descriptions of the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
Index borrows heavily from the websites of the provider and the Market Harmonics web-
site. (A deeper description in the context of forecasting consumer spending and some
other variables appears in Ludvigson (2004).)
The Consumer Conﬁdence focuses on ﬁve questions:
1. "We are interested in how people are getting along ﬁnancially these days. Would
you say that you (and your family living there) are better oﬀ or worse oﬀ ﬁnancially
than you were a year ago?"
2. "Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family
living there) will be better oﬀ ﬁnancially, or worse oﬀ, or just about the same as
now?"
3. "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that
during the next twelve months we’ll have good times ﬁnancially, or bad times, or
what?"
4. "Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole
we’ll have continuous good times during the next ﬁve years or so, or that we will
have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?"
5. "About the big things people buy for their homes—such as furniture, a refrigerator,
stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a
good or bad time for people to buy major household items?"
Answers are coded on a scale from 1 (good) to 5 (bad), and averaged (equal-weighted). The
reported Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index is a linear transform thereof. The survey
methods themselves are described in detail by Curtin (2000). An excerpt:
The monthly survey of consumers is an ongoing nationally representative survey based
on approximately 500 telephone interviews with adult men and women living in house-
holds in the coterminous United States (48 States plus the District of Columbia). The
sample is designed to maximize the study of change by incorporating a rotating panel
sample design in an ongoing monthly survey program. For each monthly sample, an
3Our earlier draft also explored other sentiment and conﬁdence indices in more detail. The results
using the Consumer Conference board consumer conﬁdence measure were similar, even though the Pearson
correlationbetweenMichiganchanges andCBchanges was“only”+52% (T-statof10.95). TheMichiganindex
focuses more on ﬁnancial conditions (and especially the individual’s own condition), while the Conference
Board index focuses more on macroeconomic conditions. Thus, for our purposes, the Michigan index is
more suitable. Moreover, because the surveyed individuals do not overlap, the measures do seem to pick
up some economy-wide sentiment factors, rather than merely the answers of just their own respondents.
8independent cross-section sample of households is drawn. The respondents chosen in
this drawing are then reinterviewed six months later. A rotating panel design results,
and the total sample for any one survey is normally made up of 60% new respondents,
and 40% being interviewed for the second time. The rotating panel design of the Sur-
veys of Consumers has several distinct advantages over a simple random sample. This
design provides for the regular assessment of change in attitudes and behavior both
at the aggregate and at the individual level. The ability to gauge individual change
expands the study of aggregate change by permitting a better assessment of the under-
lying causes of that change. The rotating panel design also permits a wide range of
research strategies made possible by repeated measurements. In addition, the sample
design supports the pooling of up to six of the independent monthly samples to achieve
larger samples, or to screen for rare populations or events.
The telephone sample is obtained by list-assisted random sampling. A great deal of consid-
eration has been expended on appropriate sampling. Further, the survey documentation
gives great emphasis to demographic sampling, sampling error, sample coverage and non-
response errors, sample weighting questionnaire design, telephone interviewing (and inter-
viewer training), coding methods, and institutional independence. New survey respondents
are rotated in only slowly. Interviews are spread rather evenly across the entire month, and
the survey is never revised.
Figure 1 and Table 1 also describe the consumer conﬁdence series. The ﬁgure plots the
time-series of annual observations for our sentiment measures. There is no correlation
between the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index and the closed-end fund discount, even
in levels. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2004) work with levels in consumer conﬁdence,4
which are non-stationary. (The auto-coeﬃcient in our data is 0.94, the auto-correlation is
96%.) This requires considerably more delicate statistics. Therefore, our paper works with
sentiment changes, the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index, called
d.bullish.mich.cc. These changes are stationary.5 [Table 1]
Table 1 shows that the average Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index is around 90. The
most bullish Michigan indices in the sample occurred in Feb 1998, and from Jan through
May of 2000. The most bearish time occurred in April and May of 1980. d.bullish.mich
has a month-to-month standard deviation of around 3. The Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
IndexhadthemostpronounceddropsinDec1980andAug1990, andthemostpronounced
improvements in Jan 2004, Mar 1991, and Nov 1992.
4The theory suggests that levels of sentiment correlate with levels of pricing, and therefore that changes
in sentiment correlate with returns. It does not easily suggest that levels of sentiment correlate with returns.
5They are stationary, but they are not i.i.d. Lagged changes have no further inﬂuence, but lagged levels
do. A time-series model suggests
d.bullish.mich.cct = −0.3719 + (−0.0444) · bullish.mich.cct−1 + noiset
R
2
= 7.2% (t= −2.38) (t= −3.18)
The adjusted R-square is modest, and more importantly, our results that follow are similar if we use the
unexpected series instead of simple changes in the two sentiment indices. For simplicity, and analogous
treatment relative to the CEFD, we use the diﬀerenced but unwhitened series.
9II Direct Validation
Our paper’s ﬁrst goal is the validation of proxies for investor sentiment. Although sen-
timent in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) is an abstract concept, an
optimal empirical validation measure would be a time-series of complete surveys of all
investors in the ﬁnancial markets, perhaps value-weighted by portfolio size. This data is
not available. However, the UBS/Gallup survey provides a reasonably plausible sampled
substitute.
A The UBS/Gallup Validation Measure
The UBS/GALLUP Index of Investor Optimism oﬀers a representative and carefully sampled
survey of investors. This measure is constructed from surveys of (randomly chosen) in-
vestors with more than $10,000 in wealth. During the ﬁrst two weeks of every month,
UBS/Gallup conducts 1,000 interviews of investors. It reports the results on the last Mon-
day of the month. (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ubs.html provides more detail.)
Our own study does not rely on their raw index, but on one question from this index:
6c. Now, I would like to ask you to think about the factors that could aﬀect the overall invest-
ment environment OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. On the same ﬁve-point scale, as far as
the general condition of the economy is concerned, how would you rate (read and rotate A-D)
Performance of the stock market, OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS? (NOTE TO INTERVIEWER:
Do NOT repeat the scale unless it is necessary to remind the respondent. If respondent says










Our paper codes a “very optimistic” as +2, a “somewhat optimistic” as +1, a somewhat
pessimistic as −1, and a “very pessimistic” as a −2, and henceforth work with the average.
Table 1 shows that the median month-to-month change in the UBS/Gallup poll was around
0.16. The most optimistic months were Dec 1999 to Feb 2000, the most pessimistic months
were Jul and Oct 2002.
The biggest drawback is that although UBS/Gallup is careful to retain the same investor
proﬁle every month, it does not retain the same investors every month. This introduces
noise into their measure. (In contrast, the consumer conﬁdence measure tends to follow
the same consumers.) Nevertheless, we believe that the UBS/Gallup survey is a good val-
idator for other investor sentiment proxies today. (See Page 14 for more alternatives.)
10Unfortunately, the UBS/Gallup survey has only been conducted beginning in October 1996,
and with regularity only beginning in 1999. We have data until December 2002. The data
series is too short for serious use in ﬁnancial research.6
B Validation Evidence
[Table 2]
The top part of Table 2 presents the ﬁrst important piece of evidence that our paper of-
fers. It shows the correlation among changes in hypothesized proxies for sentiment. Even
though respondents, questions, and resampling procedures diﬀer, there is a factor that is
common to the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index and to the UBS/Gallup investor sen-
timent surveys. The correlation between changes in consumer conﬁdence and changes in
the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment series is a positive +55.2%, which is highly statistically
signiﬁcant. The table also reports the UBS/Gallup correlation with two other conﬁdence
measures, the Conference Board measure of consumer conﬁdence, and the Michigan survey
of consumers about their conﬁdence in future business conditions. Both measures seem
to be valid, but poorer proxies for investor sentiment, which is why we do not entertain
them beyond this table.7
In contrast, there is no correlation between changes in the UBS/Gallup survey sentiment
and changes in the closed-end fund discount. The two do not seem to have a strong
common component. The disconnect between CEFD based and survey based sentiment
measure is not only in diﬀerences. Even in levels (both series are non-stationary), the
two are diﬀerent. (Correlations in levels are a necessary, but not suﬃcient validation of
sentiment measure identiﬁcation.)
Not reported in the table, we also correlated other sentiment proxies. Under the hy-
pothesis that investor sentiment is not idiosyncratic, we can validate diﬀerent measures
of investor sentiment against one another. The Conference Board and Michigan consumer
survey are from diﬀerent respondents, yet their changes correlate positively with one an-
other, too. In contrast, changes in the CEFD do not correlate at all with changes in either
measure of consumer conﬁdence. Therefore, if a researcher wants to continue to main-
tain that the CEFD has a component that measures investor sentiment, such a researcher
must posit that it is a component that would not be (strongly) reﬂected in the UBS/Gallup
investor sentiment poll or in consumer conﬁdence.
It is worthwhile to discuss potential shortcomings of our direct measure procedure:
6In addition to its better sampling method (because it measures changes for the same individual over
time), consumer conﬁdence measures are available in many countries, while the UBS/Gallup survey is also
available only in the United States. And only the consumer conﬁdence survey is available with a long, stable,
regular, and professionally executed history, suitable for ﬁnancial research. Note: As of April 2006, the
2003 disaggregated data is not yet available from the Roper center.
7The questions in the Conference Board measure are also less focused on consumer’s ﬁnancial situations
than those in the Michigan measure. This is a good ex-ante reason to focus on the latter in our context,
rather than the former.
11Bias: We rely on changes in sentiment measures, which means that our concern would
not be systematic bias, but only time-variation in the systematic bias—and such time-
varying bias changes would have to be correlated across diﬀerent respondents and
surveys. Moreover, Gallup and the Michigan Center are professional pollsters, who
select respondents appropriately randomly. Therefore, time-varying bias from these
two sources is unlikely to be an important problem.
Noise: There are at least three sources of noise. First, UBS/Gallup may sample the wrong
type of individuals. Second, respondents may not pay much attention to answering
the survey. Third, the identities of respondents changes, and respondents are not
asked about their own changing attitudes.
Therefore, a ﬁnding of no correlation could not only have meant that the Michigan
Consumer Conﬁdence Index is not a proxy for investor sentiment, but also that either
the UBS/Gallup measure or the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Measure or both are
just noisy and thus so ﬂawed as to be unusable. However, the two measures can
validate one another. If either were not correlated with an underlying “generic senti-
ment” factor, then they should not correlate with one another. After all, they come
from diﬀerent respondents. Therefore, our ﬁnding of a strong correlation of changes
in the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence index with changes in the UBS/Gallup poll is
diﬃcult to explain away as noise. Semantically, one could even deﬁne the compo-
nent that is joint to the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment and the Michigan Consumer
Conﬁdence Index as generic “sentiment.”8
Investor Identiﬁcation: A reasonable critique of survey sentiment indices is that they may
unduly measure the optimism of small investors, which are not of importance to the
stock market (although the DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) rely on identiﬁcation of noise traders with small investors).
Put diﬀerently, why should we believe that how the retiree in Mississippi changes her
views should matter in any way to how the wealthy New York city investors change
their perspectives?
Question (S5) of the UBS/Gallup survey provides a classiﬁcation of investors with
moreorlessthan$100,000instockandbondinvestments(henceforthtermed“wealthy”
and “poor”). Thus, the UBS/Gallup data allows us to split the sample between wealth-
ier investors, who declare themselves with assets above $100,000, and poorer in-
vestors. The total numbers are 22,687 “wealthy” investor-months and 29,987 “poor”
investor-months. With the UBS/Gallup investor wealth classiﬁcation, we could deter-
mine one index based on wealthy investors only, and another index based on poor
investors only. The data suggests that wealthy investors tend to be more optimistic
8It is of course another question whether this is the sentiment that is priced in the ﬁnancial markets. How-
ever, the theory does not suggest that such investor sentiment should be orthogonal to generic sentiment.
Moreover, if there are multiple dimensions of investor sentiment, then we need new theories. Moreover, if
there is not a single factor but heterogeneity in multiple sentiment measures, then overall sentiment would
likely wash out and thus play only a very small role in ﬁnancial markets.
12(mean 0.41, median 0.51) than poor investors (mean 0.30, median 0.34). This dif-
ference is statistically highly signiﬁcant. However, this diﬀerence is not important
within our context.
More importantly, the correlation between changes in the survey answers across the
two investor groups is 80.4%, again indicating that the indices can measure some
underlying factor, and not just respondent-speciﬁc noise.
The lower part of Table 2 brings more empirical evidence to bear on the relevancy
of our sampled consumers. From the perspective of pricing in ﬁnancial markets, it
would be the wealthier investors in whom we may be most interested. Table 2 shows
that the changes in the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index are as highly correlated
with changes in sentiment in the wealthy subsample as they are with changes in
sentiment in the poor subsample. (Again, changes in the CEFD have no correlation
with either investor subset.)
A related reasonable critique of survey sentiment indices is whether it is primarily
idiosyncratic and investor speciﬁc, or whether there is truly a measurable common
component that transcends individual investors. We already have some of this ev-
idence, because we know that measures from diﬀerent surveys contain a common
factor. We can further conﬁrm this among individual investors, too. We proceeded
to bootstrap 10,000 random distributions of investors, in which we randomly identi-
ﬁed 29,987 and 22,687 investors as poor and wealthy respectively, recomputed two
indices, their ﬁrst changes, and their correlation. The mean (median) correlation was
83.2% (83.5%). The evidence thus suggests that changes in sentiment are not exclu-
sively investor speciﬁc, but systematic. In the bootstrap, the empirically observed
80.4% correlation between the wealthy and poor investors sits at the 23rd percentile.
Therefore, we can conclude that there is no diﬀerence in how poor and wealthy in-
vestor sentiment changes month-to-month. Wealth is not a determinant of sentiment
changes. The critique that investor sentiment indices based on poor investors would
not accurately reﬂect the investor sentiment of wealthier investors can thus be re-
jected. More broadly, it is unlikely that investor sentiment changes of a diﬀerent
group of unsampled investors would not be picked up by our sampled investors.
In sum, we have established that the CC correlates well with the UBS/Gallup investor
sentiment measure, while the CEFD-based sentiment proxy does not. In order to continue
considering the CEFD as an investor sentiment measure, an auxiliary assumption must be
that the (relevant) noise investors are not only systematically diﬀerent from those sampled
by UBS/Gallup, but that the common factor, which appears in consumer conﬁdence, the
UBS/Gallup investor sentiment, and the UBS/Gallup poor and wealthy subset investor sen-
timents, is not suﬃciently strongly related to the true measure of investor sentiment—or
it should have shown up in CEFD changes. We view this assumption as unlikely to be true.
Direct Validation vs. Joint Hypotheses: Although we will also look at the Lee, Shleifer,
and Thaler (1991) main theory-based validation test in Section III—the performance in
13predicting small ﬁrm returns9—our paper considers the correlation of diﬀerent prox-
ies for sentiment to be a more powerful validation test (i.e., relative to the correlation
of aproxy of sentiment with the size decile return spread.) The LST test is a joint test
that must rely strongly on the theoretical conjecture itself. Without direct validation,
a proxy must lean only on theoretical conjecture. Any test relying on such a proxy
is a joint one. Not ﬁnding an eﬀect could be attributed to a fact that the sentiment
measure is poor, or to a fact that sentiment plays no role. The theory becomes practi-
cally unfalsiﬁable. Even though a correlation with sentiment is a necessary condition
in DSSW, lack of ﬁnding a pricing correlation could be rationalized away as due to a
bad sentiment proxy. Moreover, a positive ﬁnding is easier to be doubted by classical
ﬁnance proponents—the sentiment proxy may measure something diﬀerent.
With more direct validation for the measure of investor sentiment, subsequent tests
become more informative. Even a ﬁnding that a sentiment measure plays no role in
ﬁnancial markets can now become interesting and interpretable. This is why we deem
subsequent tests for the role of sentiment that use a directly validated sentiment
measure to be fundamentally better—though they are deﬁnitely not perfect.
C Other Sentiment Measures
The common use of the CEFD, both in itself and as a component in other sentiment mea-
sures, explains why our paper is especially interested in the CEFD as the right “bogey” to
begin its exploration of the literature on investor sentiment. Other sentiment measures
proposed to-date in other papers have remained “boutique measures,” which have not
found wide usage beyond authors’ own papers. (Our consumer conﬁdence currently falls
into this class, too.) It is of course impossible to compare consumer conﬁdence to all of
these series. Many are not easily available, either, and few have been validated as measures
of sentiment, rather than just hypothesized and used.
There are however a number of other measures of investor sentiment in the literature
that deserve mention. We explored some alternative measures, such as the happiness index
of the General Social Science Survey, the Luxury Consumption Retail Sales Growth index
(Ait-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004)), and Shiller’s Investor 1-Year Conﬁdence Index. None
of these were available regularly enough or showed good validation characteristics.
Fisher and Statman (2003) explore the AAII survey of individual investors. Like the
UBS/Gallup poll (and unlike the consumer conﬁdence poll), it does not track changes in
the same individuals over time. Unlike the UBS/Gallup poll, it allows members to vote
whenever they feel like it. Thus, the AAII survey has an unusually severe self-selection
problem. Further inspection reveals that the series is very volatile. Over the 47 months in
9We do not consider the CEFD correlations among diﬀerent CEFs. Multiple factors could create a positive
correlation among the two CEFDs. We also ignore CEF startup validation. As noted, our earlier draft could
not detect an inﬂuence here, although it did ﬁnd mild positive inﬂuence of the consumer conﬁdence index.
14which we had data for both, the AAII index has a −12.5% correlation with the UBS/Gallup
survey. In its 190-plus months of overlap, changes in the AAII sentiment measure are
not signiﬁcantly correlated with changes in the CEFD, the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
Index, or the Conference Board consumer conﬁdence index. There is a common factor
among the UBS/Gallup indeics and the two consumer conﬁdence surveys, but it is not
shared by the AAII index. In sum, the AAII index likely measures changing heterogeneity
in reporters more than changes in investor sentiment.
Baker and Wurgler (2004) construct an annual sentiment index based on a number of
series hypothesized to relate to investor sentiment. Unfortunately, because of its periodic-
ity (UBS/Gallup has only 3 years of monthly data, the BW index is annual), the UBS/Gallup
survey cannot be used for validation. However, we can look at the correlation between 36
years of consumer conﬁdence, the CEFD, and the BW index. Even levels of the BW senti-
ment do not correlate with consumer conﬁdence levels. (The same applies to changes.)
Therefore, whatever common sentiment factor appears in the consumer conﬁdence index,
it is not picked up by BW. The CEFD is a part of the BW index, and therefore has a 50%
correlation in levels with the BW index, and a 26% correlation in changes. Therefore, some
common factor of CEFD—and prior evidence leads us to believe that it does not contain
sentiment—explains part of the results of BW. Other constituents of BW can be related to
sentiment, or to other factors. (For example, IPO activity is closely related to recent stock
performance, especially within speciﬁc industries. It thus picks up a momentum eﬀect.)10
III The Role of Sentiment in the Financial Markets
In light of the evidence above, we believe that it is relatively uncontroversial that
1. the closed-end fund discount is not a proxy for investor sentiment;
2. the consumer conﬁdence index contains a component related to investor sentiment.
The rest of our paper explores the link between sentiment and ﬁnancial prices. The DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) prediction is that stocks disproportionally held
by noise traders are disproportionally subject to investor sentiment. We therefore explore
the following hypotheses:
1. Because small stocks are disproportionally held by noise traders, sentiment changes
should change the spread between small decile ﬁrms and large decile ﬁrms. This is
the main test in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)
10A referee suggested measures based on ﬁnancial discrepancies, such as the Palm/3COM split. If such
a violations series were possible to construct, it would be less a proxy for common investor sentiment (a
model input), but more a measure of irrational pricing in ﬁnancial markets (a model output). It would also
likely contain variations in agency or variation in trading costs that are less related to investor sentiment,
which would have to be controlled for. (Moreover, the CEFD itself does not seem to be a violation of the law
of one price; on the contrary, it may even exactly measure fund fees.) Most importantly, we do not believe
that it is feasible to construct such a “ﬁnancial irrationality index” on a regular and reliable basis.
15We try to reﬁne the LST test in two dimensions. First, we try to bring some evidence to bear
on the question of whether the sentiment pathway works primarily through the ﬁnancial
markets or primarily works through the real markets. Therefore, we try to separate out
the component of consumer conﬁdence that is likely to be reﬂected in future corporate
earnings. We extract a component of changes in consumer conﬁdence that is related to
current and future underlying economic conditions, speciﬁcally, aggregate consumption
and aggregate corporate proﬁts, and one that is not. We also have a contemporaneous
measure of business conﬁdence from a survey of CEOs. Managers’ conﬁdence should
be related more to their perspective of future corporate performance than consumers’
conﬁdence. If the pathway works primarily through the future proﬁts of ﬁrms, we would
expect CEO business conﬁdence to pick up more of this eﬀect than consumer conﬁdence.
2. Sentiment changes disproportionally do (or do not) inﬂuence small stocks through
their eﬀect on real consumption, proﬁts, or corporate performance.
Second, we try to improve on the LST measure of which stocks are held by noise traders.
We distinguish not only between stocks that are small vs. large ﬁrms, but also between
stocks that are liquid and held by institutional investors vs. stocks that are illiquid and
held by retail investors. A real-markets pathway perspective would suggest that we should
ﬁnd bigger eﬀects across ﬁrm-sizes than across ﬁnancial holdings/tradings characteristics.
A ﬁnancial-markets pathway perspective would suggest the opposite.
3. Sentiment changes disproportionally inﬂuence stocks held not by institutional but
by retail investors, especially if these stocks have insuﬃcient liquidity to allow arbi-
trageurs to impose more rational pricing.
This section ends with a discussion of what we can and what we cannot claim in light of our
evidence: Finding a link between sentiment and ﬁnancial pricing is a necessary condition
in the context of a behavioral (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)) view of
the world, but not a suﬃcient one.
A The LST Validation Metric: Excess Small Stock Returns
[Table 3]
The small stock return spread is the diﬀerence between the rates of return on the smallest-
capitalization stocks and the largest capitalization stocks, based on the well-known CRSP
decile portfolios. This variable is called smallstocks.retspread. The panel at the bottom
of Table 3 shows that small stocks outperformed large stocks in our sample period on
average, but not in the median month. The typical month-to-month standard deviation
was around 7%.
Table 3 explains this small-ﬁrm return spread. In the full-sample regression, changes
in both the Michigan and the CEFD series have statistically signiﬁcant contemporaneous
explanatory power. (The two measures are almost uncorrelated, which means that the
16coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels on one remain practically the same if we exclude the
other.) Over the full sample period, the CEFD slightly edges out the Michigan CC in terms
of signiﬁcance. A one standard deviation change in CEFD changes (2.18%) associates with
a 0.734 · 2.18% ≈ 1.6% change in the small ﬁrm excess spread. A one standard deviation
change in CC changes (3.27%) associates with a 1.3% change, just a little less. Both numbers
are an economically meaningful one-ﬁfth of the small ﬁrm spread’s standard deviation of
7.1%.
However, the subsamples show that the CEFD has lost its contemporaneous explanatory
power for the small stock return spread after 1985. The CEFD’s sign remains positive, but
the signiﬁcance drops dramatically. In contrast, the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index
survey actually improved in its ability to explain the small stock return spread.
The bottom half of Table 3 excludes January observations, long known to be peculiar.
The closed-end fund discount seems to have explanatory power only if January observa-
tions are included, even prior to 1985. Without January observations, only the Michigan
Consumer Conﬁdence Index remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Not in the ta-
ble, the January-only CEFD coeﬃcient is economically and statistically signiﬁcantly higher
than the non-January CEFD coeﬃcient. Consequently, even the LST sample itself suggests
theories in which the CEFD would act as a sentiment proxy primarily in Januaries, and less
during the rest of the year.
In sum, we interpret our evidence to suggest that the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
Index exerts an inﬂuence on the small ﬁrm stock spread. The closed-end fund discount
does not.
B The Real Economy Pathway: Consumer Conﬁdence Decomposed
We now want to determine the pathway through which the consumer conﬁdence index in-
ﬂuences ﬁnancial markets. We decompose consumer conﬁdence into a part that correlates
with real activity, and a part that is orthogonal thereto. Although there is no generally
accepted model of how consumer conﬁdence changes would translate into diﬀerential re-
turns on small vs. large ﬁrms, it is reasonable to presume that consumer conﬁdence would
work through a chain that would begin with an inﬂuence on future consumer expenditures
(explored reversely in Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (1994), Acemoglu and Scott (1994), and
Souleles (2004)), and such a chain would end with an inﬂuence on future corporate proﬁts.
We therefore obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (National Income and Product
Accounts, NIPA) the seasonally-adjusted inﬂation-adjusted series on U.S. consumption and
U.S. corporate proﬁts.11 Unfortunately, macroeconomic data is available only quarterly,
which requires us to run regressions with quarterly re-sampled data (e.g., the consumer
conﬁdence change is now computed relative to conﬁdence three months earlier). [Table 4]
11We also tried a number of other models, e.g., using the three components of aggregate consumption.
None had an important eﬀect on our inference.
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dex correlate with contemporary and future corporate proﬁts and aggregate consumption.
Models 1 and 2 suggest that, although there is a strong positive correlation between con-
temporary corporate proﬁt changes and consumer conﬁdence changes, consumer conﬁ-
dence changes do not appear to predict future corporate proﬁt changes. Models 3 to 5
suggest that changes in consumer conﬁdence predict consumption changes for up to two
quarters ahead. Finally, Model 6 incorporates both proﬁt and consumption eﬀects. (Not
reported, further leads or lags on changes in consumption or changes in corporate proﬁts
are insigniﬁcant.)
We can consider the ﬁtted regression values from Panel A as the component of the
Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index changes that is related to real economic activity,
and the regression residuals as the component that is not related.
Panel B of Table 4 predicts the small ﬁrm decile excess spread, beginning with a base
regression in which we merely include quarterly changes in the undecomposed consumer
conﬁdence. The base regression shows that we lose almost no power going from monthly
to quarterly data. The CEFD T-statistic drops from 4.85 to 3.47, the CC T-statistic increases
from 3.89 to 4.09. (Our results are similar to those in Table 3 if the sample starts in 1985 or
if Januaries are excluded—the CEFD becomes insigniﬁcant.) Of primary interest to us are
the diﬀerential correlations of sentiment changes that inﬂuenced ﬁnancial prices through
their inﬂuence on the underlying real economy, vs. those sentiment changes that had no
such link. The table shows that both pathways play a role. The coeﬃcient estimates are
generally similar, suggesting that it makes relatively little diﬀerence in pricing whether
sentiment changes are attributable to the underlying real economic situation or not. The
exception is Model 3, which controls only for contemporaneous consumption changes. In
this case, the real-economic sentiment eﬀect is stronger. However, this barely changes the
signiﬁcance of the non-real-economy related consumer conﬁdence component, and the
stronger eﬀect disappears if we add future consumption changes.
In sum, Table 4 suggests that both the component related to the underlying real econ-
omy and the component not related to the underlying real economy in the Michigan Con-
sumer Conﬁdence correlate with the decile return spread. Thus, it appears that there is
both a real pathway and a ﬁnancial pathway. The inﬂuence of consumer conﬁdence on
stock returns does not appear to be exclusively one or the other.
C The Real Economy Pathway: Competing with CEO Conﬁdence
The aggregate consumption and proﬁt link is reasonable, but it is not a generally accepted
model of how increased consumer conﬁdence is likely to translate into diﬀerential corpo-
rate present values, based on future earnings. Under one additional assumption, we can
consider an alternative method. The Conference Board publishes a quarterly measure of
CEO conﬁdence. If we assume that CEOs are relatively more attuned to the real business
conditions that apply to the proﬁts of publicly traded companies in our sample, then we
18can control for real changes in implied future proﬁts by including CEO conﬁdence in the
regression.
More precisely, our measure of CEO Conﬁdence is the quarterly survey of U.S. chief
executives. The Conference Board began this program in 1976. Questionnaires (along with
results of the prior quarter’s survey) are mailed out in the second month of the quarter
to about 800-1,000 chief executives of U.S. corporations, of which 100 typically respond.
These companies are associates of the Conference Board. They are asked four questions:
two on their assessment of the U.S. economy generally, and two on their own industry
speciﬁcally. In addition to these regular questions, one or two special supplementary ques-
tions are asked each quarter. The conference board reports for each question a weighted
sum of the percentage of respondents checking each response, as follows:
% saying SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER x 1.00
% saying MODERATELY BETTER x 0.75
% saying SAME x 0.50
% saying MODERATELY WORSE x 0.25
% saying SUBSTANTIALLY WORSE x 0.00
The main index reported by the Conference Board is the artithmetic average of three (later
four) questions ([a] current general economic conditions vs. six months ago; [b] current
economic conditions vs. six months ago for the CEO’s own industry, expectations for the
economy six months ahead; and [c] expectations for own industry six months ahead). We
use ﬁrst diﬀerences in the main index (d.ceo.conf), and ﬁrst diﬀerences in the expectations
of economic conditions six months ahead (d.ceo.exp). [Table 5]
Panel A of Table 5 again explores simple correlations, primarily for validation of the
measures. The UBS/Gallup survey still correlates strongly with the CC and not at all with
the CEFD on a quarterly basis. There is also a strong correlation between changes in CEO
conﬁdence and changes in the Michigan CC—again, a common factor in participants of
diﬀerent surveys. Unfortunately, we only have 15 quarterly observations with data on
both the UBS/Gallup measure and the CEO conﬁdence series, so this validation cannot be
done. It is positive, but not statistically signiﬁcant.12 By now not surprisingly, there is no
positive correlation between changes in CEO conﬁdence and changes in CEFD.
In sum, there is some evidence of a common factor in investor sentiment, consumer con-
ﬁdence, and CEO conﬁdence, all from independent sources; and no evidence of a common
factor in CEFD changes and various survey sentiment measures.
Panel B again predicts the extreme size decile return-spread. Controlling for changes
in CEO conﬁdence, changes in the Michigan CC retain the same eﬀect on the small ﬁrm
return spread. This suggests that the pathway through which the Michigan CC inﬂuences
the return spread is not its correlation with the CEO corporate outlook.
12In 2006, we obtained aggregated series from Gallup up to 2005, which does not help with other results
(due to lack of series overlap). Here, however, it does help. The correlation with d.ceo.exp increases to 29%
and is highly statistically signiﬁcant.
19D Retail-Held and Illiquid Stocks or Small Stocks?
The prediction of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) is that investor sen-
timent inﬂuences stocks held disproportionately by noise traders, which cannot easily be
arbitraged by more sophisticated investors. From the theory’s perspective, the ﬁrm-size
decile spread is a noisy proxy for this type of stock. After 1980, we can use 13(f) data
to identify stocks that are not held by institutional investors. These stocks should ﬁt the
theory better.
Our ﬁrst attempt was to construct portfolios as follows. In the retail portfolio, we in-
cluded only ﬁrms for which we could not identify holdings by an institutional investor
who had ﬁled a 13(f), and which ranked in the bottom half of dollar trading volume within
this zero-holdings group. (This is required in DSSW to make ineﬃciencies more diﬃcult
to arbitrage.) In the institutionally-held portfolio, we allowed not only the two top institu-
tionally held deciles, but also only those ﬁrms that rank in their decile’s top half of dollar
trading volume. (The appendix describes the construction of our retail-held illiquid stock
vs. institutionally-held liquid spread portfolios.)
The cleanest way to attribute diﬀerential eﬀects to the three portfolios is to run a
reverse regression, in which the sentiment proxies become our dependent variables. We
also entertain the unexpected component of consumer conﬁdence from the ﬁnal model
from Table 4, Panel A, as a sentiment proxy. The rates of return on three portfolios—
the S&P500, the small-ﬁrm spread portfolio, and the retail-held spread portfolio—are our
independent variables. The results are
Consumer Conﬁdence Closed-End Fund Discount
Dependent: d.bullish.mich unexp.bullish.mich d.bullish.cefd
constant −0.227 −1.03 −0.130 −0.60 −0.074 −0.61
smallstocks.xret 0.113 2.80** 0.102 2.55* 0.025 1.14
retailstocks.xret 7.948 1.87+ 8.247 1.96+ 2.043 0.86




df 281 281 270
This evidence suggests that Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index changes are correlated
on the margin primarily with the S&P500, then the small-ﬁrm stock spread, and ﬁnally the
retail-stock spread.
However, this evidence is deliberately not in a proper table, because we do not deem it to
be robust. When we subsequently explored various dependent dual-sorts, in which we tried
to enhance the distinction between small/large ﬁrms and retail-held illiquid/institutionally-
heldliquidﬁrms, wegenerallyﬁndnosigniﬁcanceatordinarylevels. Thereisagoodreason.
Almost all large ﬁrms are held primarily by institutional investors, and very few small ﬁrms
are held primarily by institutional investors. Therefore, our tests here are fragile. The
20correlation between the excess rate of return between the small-ﬁrm spread portfolio and
the retail-held spread portfolio in the above table is +51%. (Moreover, whereas the small
stock spread portfolio and the S&P500 had almost no mutual correlation, the retail-held
spread portfolio and the S&P500 had a −40% correlation.) Thus, although our inability to
improve our sort may not be surprising in light of the high correlations in portfolio returns,
it leads us to conclude that we do not have good power to disentangle the inﬂuence of (real-
economy unrelated) consumer conﬁdence on small stocks vs. retail-held stocks.
E CAUTION
The evidence in the above sections suggest that consumer conﬁdence changes, both those
related and those not related to underlying economic conditions, correlate contemporane-
ously with the return spread between small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms. The interpretation of
this evidence requires extra care, because there is considerable academic sentiment when
it comes to interpretations of investor sentiment.
Rationality: It is necessary to explain why neither our (nor any other existing) paper can
resolve whether this eﬀect is rational or irrational.
Even if ﬁnancial markets are hyper-eﬃcient in terms of securities pricing, (irrational)
sentiment could play a role. It is not diﬃcult to write down a model in which underlying
economic factors inﬂuence agents, which are both investors and consumers, and turn them
more bullish or bearish both about the real and the ﬁnancial economy. Bullish sentiment
could induce investors/consumers to make real choices (e.g., diﬀerent purchasing/saving
decisions). Such agent behavior must have implications in both the real and the ﬁnancial
markets. Even if sentiment were entirely irrational, in a ﬁnancial market in which prices
are set perfectly rationally, consumer sentiment should therefore have rational pricing
consequences. Insum, attributing the eﬀect ofconsumer sentiment on future consumption
and some correlation between stock prices and future consumption to irrational ﬁnancial
markets could be unwarranted.
Conversely, it would not be diﬃcult to write down a model in which it is the irrational
behavior and instincts that drive the correlation between the real economy and the ﬁnancial
economy. Sentiment could lead both consumers and investors to overreact, inducing a cor-
relation between consumption, consumer sentiment, and stock prices, even if the present
value of corporate proﬁts were to remain mostly unchanged. Attributing even the part
of the eﬀect of consumer sentiment on stock prices that comes from future consumption
changes to rational ﬁnancial market pricing could be equally unwarranted.
Some distinctions may be outright philosophical. Sentiment could change investors’
eﬀective risk-aversion, too. This should also change the discount rate, and whether such
changes should be considered rational or irrational is a philosophical question.
The only deﬁnitive way to use the evidence to discriminate between the classical ratio-
nal and the behavioral irrational perspective is to have either perspective provide speciﬁc
21predictions of exactly how much investor sentiment (or a proxy thereof) should inﬂuence
ﬁnancial prices.13 It requires not just directions, but quantitative predictions. In the ab-
sence of quantitative theories, proponents of either perspective can claim for themselves
the large part of any eﬀect that overlaps with both perspectives. Until we have such theo-
ries, no paper can fully conﬁrm or reject one of the two perspectives in favor of the other.
The fact that we cannot resolve whether the sentiment inﬂuence is rational or irrational
does not mean that it is uninformative. Our paper did establish a necessary, but not a suﬃ-
cient condition for the perspective advanced in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990). The fact that the pathway is not exclusively a real economy phenomenon may fur-
ther mildly favor the behavioral perspective.
Causality: Our paper has no evidence on causality. A third factor, e.g., a component of
GDP, could inﬂuence both ﬁnancial returns and sentiment indices. On some level, this is
semantics—this component could be called (derived) generic sentiment, and it would be
picked up by our proxies. The direction of the link is also not determinable. For example,
if good portfolio performance, especially of the small-ﬁrm components within the broader
portfolio, cause investors to be more exuberant, then the small ﬁrm return itself becomes
a proxy of sentiment—a diﬀerent mechanism through which survey measures and small
ﬁrms could be correlated.14
IV Other Findings
Three further empirical ﬁndings are worth reporting.
A The Cross-Section of Stock Returns
We experimented with whether the sentiment factor is priced in cross-section. That is, we
wanted to see whether loading on the sentiment factors can explain the cross-section of
returns. To explore this, we downloaded the Fama-French factors and the 25 Fama-French
portfolios from Ken French’s website.
13If researchers could identify the component of stock prices that was irrational, it would solve this
dilemma. Alas, this is an even taller order. Stock returns are too noisy to allow us to reliably and con-
vincingly measure “overshooting,” at least as of yet.
14The ﬁnancial markets correlations hypothesized in DSSW and LST are contemporaneous, and the link
could even be so direct that it is almost mechanical: For example, if small decile stocks go up and increase
the wealth of small investors, retail investors could use the returns to purchase more CEFs and thereby
narrow the CEFD. Or, if the CEFD narrows, retail investors’ portfolio would do relatively well, and could buy
more small ﬁrms. However, this is not the case in the data. Moreover, even among retail investors, few
portfolios are likely to be so small ﬁrm biased that the small ﬁrm eﬀect would overwhelm the market rate
of return in terms of wealth signiﬁcance. Moreover, a referee wondered whether the wealth eﬀects could be
strong enough to explain all the correlation. This is unlikely, because we explain the zero-investment decile
net spread, not the positive-investment market return. Even though retail investors do have a small ﬁrm
bias relative to institutional investors, the spread is likely to be the a less important determinant of most
retail investors’ portfolio performance than the market rate of return. (The possible exception may be the
Tech bubble in the late 1990s.) We do not have individual investor data to test this further.
22Changes in the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index have a 16.6% correlation with SMB,
no correlation with HML, and a 17.8% correlation with the FF excess rate of return on the
market. (This is why it is necessary to control for the market rate of return in Table 3.)
In contrast, the CEFD has 13.3% correlation with SMB, 8.1% correlation with HML, and 11%
correlation with the market. The Michigan correlations remain the same in the subsample
post 1985, but the correlation of the CEFD index change. The CEFD loses its correlation
with both SMB and HML, and retains only its correlation with the excess market rate of
return (which increases to 25%).
We then followed a Fama-MacBeth type procedure. We formed exposures to the factors
for each of the 25 Fama-French portfolio over 5 years, and then correlated these with the
cross-section of portfolio returns net of the risk-free rate in the following month. We ran
this test for 390 months (1965/08 to 2002/12), and report average “gamma’s” and their
time-series T-statistic. This sample period is known to not have been overly favorable to
size, and includes the Tech bubble period, which was not favorable to value ﬁrms.
Dependent Variables: 25 Portfolio Returns in Each X-Sectional Regression
Time-Series Statistics of Gamma’s from 360 Monthly Regressions
constant M − rF SMB HML Mich CEFD
Model 1 Sentiment Only 0.73 0.55
T-stat (2.6) (1.1)
Model 2 Sentiments Only 0.63 0.14 0.96
T-stat (2.0) (0.3) (2.5)
Model 3 All Factors 1.39 −0.76 0.52 0.37 0.39 −0.22
T-stat (5.0) (−1.3) (1.8) (1.0) (0.8) (−0.9)
Model 4 Fama-French Factors 1.49 −1.14 0.41 0.17
T-stat (5.1) (−2.2) (1.6) (0.5)
The results suggest that portfolios that correlate more with changes in consumer con-
ﬁdence do not earn a higher rate of return than stocks that correlate less. Interestingly,
although the closed-end fund discount is not a proxy for investor sentiment, portfolio ex-
posure to changes in the CEFD do appear to be a priced factor if SMB and HML are not
included. This may, however, partly explain why the CEFD remains a popular factor in
academic research.
B The Time-Structure of Correlation of Sentiment and the Overall Stock Market
It is also reasonable to ask not just whether sentiment correlates with the stock spread, but
also whether it can correlate with the overall stock market rate of return at diﬀerent leads
or lags. The channel may be behavioral or classical (and, unlike for the spread portfolios,
wealth eﬀects can play a good role in this correlation). Indeed, sentiment should not fall
like manna from heaven. Instead, any reasonable sentiment index should be inﬂuenced by
23recent positive stock returns—and especially recent high overall stock market (portfolio)
returns, and have (mild) persistent eﬀects on return spreads. The following are the t-
statistics on the correlations between changes in our sentiment measures, and two monthly
rate of return series:
Size-Decile Based Small Stock Return Spread
Lead/Lag of −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
d.bullish.mich −1.7 −1.3 −1.5 0.0 1.6 3.9 1.7 1.8 −0.7 1.0 0.4
d.bullish.cefd −0.5 0.9 −0.9 −0.5 1.0 4.7 −0.7 −1.3 −1.6 1.1 2.1
S&P500 Percent Change
Lead/Lag of −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
d.bullish.mich 0.6 −1.5 −0.9 0.5 0.5 3.8 5.2 3.6 −1.2 −1.1 1.3
d.bullish.cefd 1.4 −0.6 −0.2 −1.0 0.5 2.4 0.2 −1.9 −0.9 0.6 0.3
(sentiment anticipates return) (return anticipates sentiment)
In a Granger causality sense, signiﬁcant numbers on the left imply that the sentiment index
predicts (inﬂuences) the return, numbers on the right imply that the sentiment index is
predicted (inﬂuenced) by the return.15 The market-adjustment in the middle panel is done
by hedging out the in-sample S&P500 return via regression. (The numbers are similar for
other retail spreads.)
The CEFD series’ inﬂluence has very little persistence. The eﬀects of changes in the
Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index seem to both be inﬂuenced by the lagged small stock
return spread and inﬂuence the future small stock return spread. The relationship is
even stronger for the inﬂuence of past market-wide rate of returns. We would argue that
the consumer conﬁdence correlation patterns are desirable characteristics for an investor
sentiment index.
Durell (2001) explored similar questions, primarily related to issues of long-term cor-
relations of overall stock market returns with consumer conﬁdence indices. The paper is
diﬀerent from our own not only in emphasis (he explores the relation between the market
and the consumer conﬁdence index in more detail than our one subsection here), but also
in some ﬁndings—not all his ﬁndings are similar to our own. From our perspective, most
importantly, he ﬁnds a theoretically reasonable correlation between one component of the
Conference Board consumer conﬁdence index and the CEFD. This—and some other mild
diﬀerences in results—may be partly due to diﬀerences in speciﬁcations (he tends to use
longer-term returns), partly due to data (he uses only the Conference Board index and only
one component thereof), and partly due to sample period (he has overlapping data for the
CEFD and the Conference Board for only seven years, 1978–1985).
15We have nothing to say about true causality—whether sentiment (in the form of the CEFD or in the
form of consumer conﬁdence) “drives” ﬁnancial markets or vice-versa. If anything, both may be driven
by an underlying unmeasured variable, an abstract sentiment, or something even deeper. And we would
also expect feedback loops: when the stock market drops, it may cause a drop in investor and consumer
conﬁdence, which in turn can cause a further drop in the stock market, and so on.
24We also present some evidence of mild feedback eﬀects between consumer conﬁdence
and stock returns—a desirable feature of a sentiment index. In sum, our evidence suggests
that sentiment (as measured by the consumer conﬁdence) plays a role in ﬁnancial markets,
but that the CEFD may be the wrong measure of sentiment.
C Out-of-Sample Data: Sentiment in the United Kingdom
Consumer conﬁdence has the advantage that it is available in many other countries, which
can serve as an out-of-sample test. Doukas and Milonas (2004) report that the closed-
end fund discount fails to explain small stock excess returns in Greece. Although we do
not have access to Greek data, we are able to do some preliminary exploration of our
relationship in the United Kingdom, because Dimson, Nagel, and Quigley (2004) kindly
made their U.K. decile portfolio return data (1955-2001) available to us. As with U.S. data,
we compute an excess rate of return of small ﬁrms over large ﬁrms. There are 4 months
in which the excess return exceeded 20%, among them 35% in November 1999, and 24% in
January 2000. There was only 1 month in which the return was signiﬁcantly below −10%,
which was −19% in December 1999. (The next smallest excess returns were −10.6%.) These
returns were about four (!) standard deviations oﬀ the series mean,16 which leads us to
believe that the 11/99 to 01/00 period was highly unusual and perhaps not representative.
Therefore, it is probably appropriate to exclude these three months or winsorize them. As
our proxy for the market rate of return, we use the rate of return on the FTSE index.
The European Commission publishes consumer conﬁdence data, beginning in January
1985. This means that we only have 204 data points with both consumer conﬁdence and
stock return data to work with. The EC data contains not only the general consumer conﬁ-
dence indicator (CC, series 99), but also a ﬁnancial situation indicator (FSI, series 01), and
a general economic situation indicator (ESI, series 03). The change in CC has a mean of
0.04 and a standard deviation of 3.2; the change in FSI (ESI) has a mean of 0.10 (0.10) and
a standard deviation of 2.6 (4.9).17
Reporting all coeﬃcients in percent, explaining contemporaneous small ﬁrm excess
returns, we ﬁnd that
Explaining U.K. Small Firm Excess Returns With Changes in Consumer Conﬁdence
Full Sample, 1955-2001 0.628 + 0.158 · ∆CC + (−5.76) · RFTSE + 
t-stat (1.35) (1.08) + (−0.59)
excl. 11/99-01/00 0.498 + 0.308 · ∆CC + (−13.55) · RFTSE + 
t-stat (1.23) (2.43*** ) + (−1.61)
winsorized at ±2σ 0.360 + 0.219 · ∆CC + (−7.10) · RFTSE + 
t-stat (0.95) (1.84) + (−0.90)
16The mean excess return was 0.6% per month with a standard deviation of 6.5%.
17The EC also publishes forward looking statistics, and the results are reasonably similar to those reported
below.
25The t-statistics on changes in conﬁdence improve to 2.00, 2.83, and 2.60 if we replace
changes in consumer conﬁdence (CC) with changes in the economic situation indicator (ESI).
Changes in the FSI component are however less signiﬁcant, contrary to our expectation. In
sum, the U.K. “out-of-sample” evidence seems generally supportive of a similar inﬂuence
of sentiment—with the exception of three months at the end of the Tech bubble period
during which excess returns were four standard deviations out.
D Unreported Findings
We also explored a number of other relations, and some are worth a brief mention.
First, unlike LST, we found no correlation between the CEFD and CEF startups in the
SDC data base. On an annual basis, there is some mild evidence that more CEFs start up
when consumer conﬁdence is bullish. Second, changes in GDP have only modest correla-
tion, as do changes in the unemployment rates. CC Sentiment seems to turn bullish when
unemployment decreases—a sensible correlation. Controlling for GDP and unemployment
does not change the reported results. Third, the CEFD is really like a book-market ratio. We
can ascertain that when the Fama-French book-market factor changes, so does the CEFD.
(The CC does not correlate therewith.) Fourth, there is no interest rate or IPO startup cor-
relation with the CEFD. However, consumers turned more bullish at times when interest
rates ros.
V Summary of Findings and Interpretation
Our paper distinguishes sharply between validation of investor sentiment proxies through
the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey, and such measures’ correlations with ﬁnancial
market series.
1a. The closed-end fund discount (CEFD) cannot be validated as a proxy for investor
sentiment, using direct UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey data. In light of our
evidence, we believe it to be inadmissible as a reasonable proxy for investor sentiment.
1b. The Consumer Conﬁdence can be validated as a proxy for investor sentiment, using
direct UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey data. (The CEFD has no correlation with
consumer conﬁdence, either.)
The fact that respondents in diﬀerent surveys—wealthy and poor investors sampled
by UBS/Gallup, consumers sampled by the Michigan Consumer Research Center, con-
sumers sampled by the Conference Board, and CEOs sampled by the Conference
Board—answer in a positively correlated fashion would be hard to reconcile with the
notion that these measures are noisy or irrelevant to some true proxy for generic sen-
timent. More likely, any true investor sentiment measure would correlate positively
with the consumer conﬁdence.
262a. The CEFD does not robustly correlate with the excess rate of return on small ﬁrms,
either in non-Januaries pre-1985, or in any months post-1985. It thus fails the Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) validation. Thus, without even their own validation, use of
the CEFD is based only on a theoretical conjecture, which we found to be inconsistent
with the data.
2b. The consumer conﬁdence index correlates with the excess rate of return on small
ﬁrms. It thus passes the Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) indirect validation.
2c. The mechanism through which the consumer conﬁdence inﬂuences ﬁnancial returns
operates neither exclusively through the real underlying economic markets, nor ex-
clusively through the ﬁnancial markets. Instead, both pathways seem to matter.
In sum, we interpret our evidence to suggest that it should be agreed that only the con-
sumer conﬁdence and not the CEFD qualiﬁes as a proxy for investor sentiment. It should
further be agreed that such investor sentiment does have a contemporaneous correlation
with certain ﬁnancial market prices, speciﬁcally the size decile spread. The evidence sug-
gests that this eﬀect is likely to come from both a ﬁnancial and a real channel. This evi-
dence should not be interpreted as being necessarily due to rational or irrational ﬁnancial
markets. Until either of these perspectives can oﬀer exact quantitative predictions, it is
unlikely that any paper can separate the two.
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28A Frequently and Referee Asked Questions (FAQ)
(This section is ultimately not for publication.)
Here are the earlier referee reports. Many of these questions are diﬃcult to address in the main paper
(or we had addressed them but the referee had overlooked them). The reports are almost unabridged:
A QJE (May 2005)
1. (QJE #1): It seems to me that in order to evaluate the merits of a potential sentiment index one
needs to have in mind the particular application for which the index is going to be used.
If every situation required its own choice of investor sentiment, how could one ever reject behavioral
hypotheses? Hopefully, there is a meaningful universal sentiment, that does not wash out but has
inﬂuence—and we think we do have some evidence that it exists.
2. (QJE #1): For example, if one is interested in thinking about IPOs and SEOs as an arbitrage re-
sponse to potential market ineﬃciencies, it might make sense to have an index based on obvious
violations of the law of one price in new equity issues: e.g., one might try to count the number
of instances in a year that there were ﬂagrant violations like in the Palm/3Com situation, and use
this as the right-hand-side variable in a regression to explain IPO or SEO volume.
We have sacriﬁced three chicken, and performed the rain-dance. Alas, we still cannot construct such a
series. It still seems to us that this is infeasible. Moreover, we think it is the wrong measure. Therefore,
we sacriﬁced three more chicken in our quest to obtain a model input measure (sentiment), not the
suggested model output measure (ﬁnancial mispricing). How does one test a theory that is about
inputs→outputs with an output measure? See, it would not be absurd to believe that mispricing in
ﬁnancial markets is not driven by sentiment but by another phenomenon such as agency conﬂicts.
(Moreover, the series of pricing violations would pick up changes in transaction costs more than
changes in sentiment.) Therefore, the price violation series might not be a sentiment measure series,
atall, regardlessofwhethersentimentmattersornot. (Ourreviseddraftalsooﬀersabetterdiscussion
now on Page 15 and its footnote.)
3. (QJE #1 continued): From this perspective, a conceptual virtue of the CEFD measure is that, since
it shares this law-of-one-price type of benchmarking, it is cleanly interpretable as being about
obvious mistakes made by investors; that is, it is hard to interpret a 20% closed end-fund premium
as anything but a mistake. Thus if it were the case that the CEFD measure were robustly correlated
with both new fund formation as well as IPO and SEO activity more generally, we would have a
pretty good story about these new issues being a response to clear-cut pricing errors. Of course,
if this is not the case in the data, too bad, and the paper does an important service by pointing out
that the CEFD is a less robust variable in this regard than might previously have been thought.
Totally false.
• See preceding.
• Changes in the CEFD are not a good proxy for changes in the violation of the law of one price.
The diﬀerential is probably due mostly to a fund fee wedge (in addition to a liquidity issue
wedge)—an agency issue. The CEFD is not a violation of the law of one price. Indeed, it may be
exactly the opposite—conﬁrmation of the law of one price, given closed-end fund fees.
• We do not see a correlation between CEFD changes and IPO/SEO startups in the data. (We see
no correlation between CEFD changes and other sentiment proxies, either.)
4. (QJE #1): By contrast, the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index—as well as the apparently some-
what related UBS/Gallup index—cannot be so narrowly interpreted. As I read the Michigan ques-
tions, it seems like I could perfectly well interpret the resulting sentiment measure as captur-
ing rational or quasi-rational time-variation in individual-investor risk tolerance, perhaps due to
changes in expected future wealth or investment opportunities.
Serious?! If I understand this concern, it is “could the survey just measure rational monthly changes
in derived risk-tolerance, which are induced by monthly wealth changes?” The argument has the
right direction, but the order of magnitude would be totally wrong. It seems exceedingly unlikely that
changes in a part of even a semi-rational investor’s portfolios could be big enough to have a large
inﬂuence on their derived risk aversion month-to-month.
29• We predict the small ﬁrm zero-investment net spread, not the market rate of return. Indeed,
we hold the market rate of return constant, and this is not what is loading! So, the usual overall
portfolio wealth change is not what our spread variable can capture.
• Let’s do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of what sort of implied risk tolerance changes one
could get for a rational investor if our dependent variable were not a zero-investment return
spread, but the positive-investment small ﬁrm return. The maintained assumption is a rational
world. The stock portfolio would be a small part of life-time income and wealth (bonds, real
estate, etc.). The decile-10 ﬁrms would be only a small part of our rational retail investor’s
portfolio (if economy-value-weighted, less than 1%). The month-to-month dollar return would be
only a fraction of the value of the investor’s small ﬁrms in the portfolio (say 5%). These fractions
are multiplicative. The last multiplicative factor is how much the rational, derived risk-tolerance
of an investor should change. In other words, how much more risk-seeking would a rational
investor become, if lifetime net worth would increase in a month by even an astronomical 1%,
say from $1 million to $1.01 million, and then back to $1 million? Such monthly changes in
derived risk tolerance would seem trivial for anyone half-way rational with any reasonable utility
function.
Of course, if investors are irrational and just feel wealthier or just feel luckier or just feel smarter,
then an argument like this can work—but this is the argument for investor sentiment. If investors
have a high risk tolerance and the next month a low risk tolerance, and this changes every month,
philosophically this should be considered sentiment.
Moreover, ourpaperdoesnotsaythatwecanexcludearationalperspective. Sorry, inthiscontext, that
is without quantitative predictions by the behavioral or classical model as to exact return behavior,
no paper can do this convincingly—although we concede that other papers set out using sentiment
under the assumption that it measures irrational behavior.
5. (QJE #1): The latter version of the story strikes me as particularly problematic for the authors’
conclusions. It suggests a mechanical sort of hard-wiring-in the limit, that respondents to the
survey are eﬀectively just answering the question: "how did your personal stock portfolio do
this month?". To the extent that this is the case, the Michigan index will of course appear to work
well in explaining the contemporaneous returns of small retail-owned stocks. But it would be
wrong to conclude, as the authors do, that this makes the Michigan index an appropriate measure
of investor sentiment for other applications.
To the extent that this is the case, it is exactly what we consider to be sentiment! This is because
immediate questions are not about the past portfolio performance, but about general outlook, and if
the answers about outlook depended one-to-one on past portfolio performance, then past portfolio
performance would be a measure of sentiment.
More generally, we would expect that less unemployment and more wealth and a rising stock market
would make naive retail investors more buoyant about the future. (In what [behavioral] theory would
this not be the case?) Optimism and sentiment that is correlated must not fall like manna from heaven.
If some proposed proxy does not correlate with any macroeconomic conditions, e.g., employment,
recessions, and depressions, it would not exactly speak for this measure as a proxy for sentiment.
And, again, sentiment can be rational or irrational; we have no single causal mechanism in mind. We
further discuss this in Section III.E It speciﬁcally addresses the hard-wiring (which is unlikely to be a
big factor).
6. (QJE #2): There seems to be a wide variety of sentiment measures out there. A quick web search
reveals many other "sentiment" measures, such as:
• the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases;
• change in margin borrowing, from the Fed;
• net mutual fund redemptions;
• premia on "Primes" and "Scores" (used to trade on the American Stock Exchange, split the
value of a stock into dividends and capital gains)
• some notion of market liquidity, measured by lower bid-ask spreads, lower price impacts of
trading, higher turnover, the number of advancing to declining issues;
• each of the ﬁve non-CEFD measures in the "BW Sentiment Index" short interest;
• implied volatility of S&P 500 index options (the "VIX") and the similar Nasdaq-100 VXN com-
puter database counts of "bullish" and "bearish" words in the news media buy-sell indexes,
stock by stock, using data on individual investor trades
30• American Association of Individual Investors surveys
• Investors Intelligence surveys
• Surveys put out by Consensus Inc. and Market Vane
So given what the literature has already looked at, the question is why study these particular
measures.
• No alternative measures seem to have the popular following of the CEFD or enjoy even half
the prominence of the CEFD. The CEFD still seems to be the right “bogey.” Every theory in
which investor sentiment appears as a concept seems to point to empirical papers that use the
CEFD either as a primary sentiment measure, or as a component in constructing one. Perhaps
the most prominent working papers right now circulating in this arena is Baker and Wurgler
(2004)), and it does rely on the CEFD.
• It is correct that other sentiment measures have been proposed, but our impression is that,
except for the CEFD, they are all “boutique.” We could not ﬁnd measures that seem to have
been used by more than three authors/papers. Moreover, we could not even locate most of the
papers (and therefore ask the authors for the variables). We cannot ﬁnd reasonably common
alternatives in published papers in good journals. We cannot even replicate the referee’s search
to locate all these variables—and it would be impossible to write a paper about sentiment if we
have to deal with every sentiment measure that has appeared in some outlet somewhere. Still,
we would love to look at other reasonably common sentiment proxies. (We did ask the referee
for a list of references, but did not receive an answer.)
• In our revised version, we try to address one issue sharply, rather than write an encyclopedical
paper about possible sentiment measures. We believe we oﬀer one reasonable alternative sen-
timent measure, which does validate well against the UBS/Gallup poll. (We cannot possibly go
after all possible measures of sentiment. We need some speciﬁc targets. We will be happy to
try out other time-series measures that authors want to provide us with.) For a discussion of
the AAII investor sentiment survey, please see faq question 9 below.
• Most other investor sentiment measures are just hypothesized constructs—proposed but never
attempted to be validated. Consumer conﬁdence at least validates against the direct UBS/Gallup
sentiment survey. Do we know what these other proxies really measure?
7. (QJE #2): Put diﬀerently, the literature has come a long way since Lee, Shleifer, Thaler (1991)
looked at CEFD.
It is alive and well, but where has it gone to?
• What, now, is a good measure of sentiment?
• We know of no earlier paper that critiques it along the lines proposed in our own paper.
• Which papers exactly have rejected the CEFD in a similar context to our’s, i.e., the context in
which the CEFD was originally validated (small ﬁrm returns)? Is this really a common ﬁnding?
There were no earlier articles in publication that we are aware of. All we knew was the “Miller”
dispute, which is very diﬀerent from what we point out—actually, if Miller had looked at January
separately, they would have had much more convincing evidence. We do. Also, Miller lost this
argument in the opinion of many.
• We have not seen LST write that the CEFD should not be used, nor does there seem to be a
clear consensus about the fact that CEFD should be avoided in the behavioral ﬁnance literature.
Instead, the CEFD lives on, though now often as a component of other ad-hoc, unvalidated
proxies.
• Attacking the CEFD is the focal point of Steve Ross’ “crusade” against behavioral ﬁnance. (Ross’
critique is based on the diﬀerent transaction cost argument, though.) Ross is right. The CEFD
is not a measure of investor sentiment. Ross will ultimately win this argument. In the long run,
continued reliance on a faulty measure (the CEFD), or the hope of anonymous diﬀusion that the
CEFD is faulty, can only end up discrediting a potentially useful concept (investor sentiment).
Seriously, what is wrong with consumer conﬁdence—it does work well, is stable, and validates
directly.
318. (QJE #2): The related question is why should we think (a priori) that consumer conﬁdence surveys
are better than CEFD (and all of the above measures). What is the motivation—given that many
questions come to mind. The Michigan survey, which the paper favors, is a monthly telephone
survey of 500 people, and only a fraction of them may have an intelligent opinion about the
economy, and only a fraction of those will have a decent-sized portfolio.
These are the types of investors DSSW and behavioral ﬁnance is hypothesizing about. They are not
hypothesizing about professional investors and economists. Wealthier investors and poorer investors
respond alike. UBS/Gallup investors respond alike. CFOs respond alike. (Are they all conspiring to
answer based on an irrelevant signal?!) Sentiment is a good name for this common factor—and it
seems to be a good part of both investor sentiment and consumer conﬁdence. See also Section II.B.
9. (QJE #2): But the American Association of Individual Investors and Investors Intelligence sur-
veys (the former goes back to the early 1960’s, don’t know about the former) are available and
presumably better because they survey larger samples, and only investors.
See Page 14. Aside, it is not a universally accepted prominent standard to make it interesting enough
to be a primary “bogey.”
10. (QJE #2): Also, the questions asked by the consumer conﬁdence surveys (on page 8) don’t have
any direct bearing on "investor sentiment" as opposed to general feelings about the economy and
personal ﬁnancial conditions.
Yes. Measures need validation. How would one explain its correlation with investor sentiment? (And
please read our discussion about the drawbacks of the consumer conﬁdence as a measure.)
11. (QJE #2): Also, the CC surveys are monthly, but big bubble-pop cycles seem to happen over several
years, so I don’t know whether there can even be 400 independent data points on sentiment, even
if it was measurable, or something more like 10 or 20 over this sample period.
Good question. The evidence seems to suggest there is a more high-frequency eﬀect here. (Of course,
most papers in the sentiment literature would be aﬀected, not just our’s.) Annual sentiment measures
in other academic papers rely on conjecture of their proxy, and not on any direct validation, in their
use. They are often themselves ﬁnancial variables (outcomes), rather than measures of individual’s
sentiment (model inputs). In our opinion, there is just not enough data right now one way or the other.
(We did try some annual measures, and they produced similar results.) The only paper that we know
that consider more long-term sentiment is Baker and Wurgler (2004)), but we ﬁnd their sentiment
proxy to not be one at all. (And, on a long-term basis, can one ever distinguish time-varying expected
rates of return, perhaps risk-aversion based, from sentiment?) Is sentiment just a philosophical
concept?
12. (QJE #2): Another question is do we want a measure that isolates "sentiment" from macroeconomic
conditions, or not. CEFD seems to have the separateness property, but these CC surveys do not.
No, we do not want isolated sentiment. The theories are about sentiment, not about sentiment or-
thogonal to macroeconomic conditions. In what theory would we expect sentiment not to be related
to unemployment, GDP, portfolio returns, wealth changes, etc.? (Answer: None!) Sentiment does not
drop like manna from heaven. We may need the decomposition to shed light on pathway, though.
Also, please see our improved discussion of mechanisms and real vs ﬁnancial pathways.
13. (QJE #2): CEFD seems to have the separateness property, but these CC surveys do not.
Yes, the CEFD does have a separateness property to the economy, but not to the ﬁnancial markets.
(One has to have strong beliefs that the CEFD is driven primarily by sentiment, and not by, e.g., a
book/market or other ﬁnancial non-sentiment factor.)
14. (QJE #2): I would say that the paper should address these questions. Given the many alternatives
to CEFD, it is not surprising that one can ﬁnd a measure that beats it on some metrics.
We did not try dozens of boutique measures to identify one that works. We only tried one, based
on our priors. This has not been a data mining exercise. Also, you seem to suggest that the CEFD is
still the measure to beat. Did our measure and tests not convincingly eliminate CEFD? What else is
required to overturn the CEFD?
15. (QJE #2): But, measuring "sentiment" is (apparently) quite diﬃcult and controversial, and is al-
ways going to involve some subjectivity. We will always need to add some prior judgment before
saying such and such is "the" better measure of sentiment. In other words, it is important to
have measures with a strong a priori motivation as well as strong performance in various statis-
tical respects. The consumer conﬁdence surveys seem lacking in a priori motivation, at least in
comparison to the many available alternative measures.
• Exactly, what many alternative common measures are readily available and generally accepted
or at least commonly used?
32• Did the inventors of other proxies just do what we are accused of—use an ’a priori’ opinion?
• Have these inventors empirically validated their measures, not in terms of ﬁnancial market
correlations, but in terms of some form of “sentiment” interpretation?
• We are just stunned by the ﬁrm belief that the CEFD remains the right measure, despite our
evidence. What evidence does it take to change it? How strong are the priors that the CEFD is
the right measure?
Aside, we only had one idea for a proxy—consumer conﬁdence.
16. (QJE #2): The paper considers a couple of metrics: their correlation with "direct" UBS/Gallup
survey of investor sentiment; correlation with the gap between small vs. large stocks and between
individual vs. institutionally-owned stocks; correlation with closed-end fund IPOs. By each of
these metrics, the consumer conﬁdence measure seems to outperform the CEFD measure. The
correlation with the UBS/Gallup survey is interesting, but if this type of "direct" survey is viewed
as a superior measure in the ﬁrst place, then why not use the American Association of Individual
Investors survey, for which the data go way back, as noted above.
Please, not again. (The paper was not even published in an academic, but in a practitioner oriented
journal.) See Page 14.
17. (QJE #2): Let’s take a look at the time series plots of the metrics. Something to like about the Michi-
gan Consumer Conﬁdence Index in Figure 1 is that it’s high and rising during the Internet mania.
(The negative of) CEFD, however, isn’t doing much of anything over the last few years. But, look
closer, and think about why Michigan CC jumps so dramatically in 1975, 1982/1983, and 1992.
I’m not certain, but I don’t believe those are stock market bubble years. Rather, the main factor is
that the US was coming out of recessions. (Business conditions were also very strong in the late
1990s.) Business conditions are genuinely getting better, consumers are "more conﬁdent". Is it
at all surprising that small stocks, with precariously undiversiﬁed product lines, would generally
do better than large stocks as the economy improves? This doesn’t say much of anything about
investor sentiment, it merely corroborates CC as a business cycle indicator. Likewise, it’s not a
stretch to think that stocks owned by retail investors would also do better as CC improves. Retail
investors tend to hold stocks in ﬁrms with which they are familiar, in particular those they buy
products from. If those investors feel better about their own personal ﬁnancial prospects, they
will buy more-presumably from the places they shop at, which are overrepresented in their port-
folios. Once again, what does investor sentiment, as opposed to a completely rational revaluation
of stocks’ prospects, have to do with why Michigan CC does better than CEFD on these metrics?
Ultimately, we will not be able to interpret sentiment as rational or irrational, because neither classical
nor behavioral ﬁnance can tell us what part of the overlapping evidence they exactly allow for. Thus,
either camp can claim for themselves any evidence that is overlapping (i.e., can be interpreted as
either). This is the case for all sentiment measures. Our revised paper does better on distinguishing
pathways. This is not perfect. Sentiment inﬂuence is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for
the DSSW behavioral hypothesis. See our extended discussion in Section II.B.
B RFS (Jan 2006)
1. (RFS #1): “The paper oﬀers little that is new. We know from Lemmon and Portniagunina (2004)
that consumer conﬁdence is related to the small-ﬁrm diﬀerential. We also know from them that
there is an unstable relationship between consumer conﬁdence and the sentiment measure of BW
that included the CEFD among its components.”
The L&P paper is independent and contemporaneous. It has the same ideas our paper has—consumer
sentiment, comparison to B&W and the CEFD, a retail premium. It had better luck with referees, so it
is now forthcoming in the RFS. There are some diﬀerences, though:
• Most importantly, L&P work with levels of consumer conﬁdence. This variable has an auto-
coeﬃcient of 0.96 in our data—it is a non-stationary variable. (L&P run regressions on this level
measure, and, even though they may be valid, the statistical properties are not straightforward.)
In contrast, our paper works with diﬀerences in consumer sentiment.
• For the most part, the theory relates prices to sentiment, and returns to sentiment changes. L&P
relate sentiment levels to returns.
• L&P are perhaps less critical of the CEFD.
33• L&P do not consider validation, and do not use the UBS/Gallup measure. We believe that, though
simple, this is important.
• We cannot compare our relative interpretations of the role of the retail spread (them: signiﬁcant;
us: not-robust), because we do not know how they computed their portfolios.
In their favor, L&P did try to control for more macroeconomic variables, such as Lettau/Ludvigson’s
CAY. (Of course, CAY has as two of its components future wealth and future income, which could
relate to future returns. In this context, it should be harmless, though.)
2. (RFS #1): The empirical work is poorly executed. For example, the returns of small stocks and
those of the S&P 500 Index are highly correlated. Placing both as independent variables, as in
the equation on p.22, is the likely cause of the negative coeﬃcient on small stock returns and the
positive coeﬃcient on the S&P 500 returns.
It’s just a common market model.
3. (RFS #1): There are advantages and disadvantages to surveys of sentiment, such as consumer
conﬁdence, and inference of sentiment from market data, such as the CEFD. People do not always
do what they say.
True. There is no particular reason here why respondents would lie, though. Also, the sampled
individuals by UBS/Gallup are diﬀerent from those sampled by Michigan (and the Conference Board).
What factor would explain the correlation if one set of them lied? This would have to be strangely
coordinated lies (or mistakes).
4. (RFS #1): Moreover, it is likely that there is more than one sentiment at a given time. For exam-
ple, Fisher and Statman (Financial Analyst Journal, 2000) found that the sentiment of Wall Street
Strategists is uncorrelated with that of writers of investment newsletters but both are useful in
the prediction of future returns.
If there is no strong common factor, what good is the concept of investor sentiment? The AAII has
issues. Please see our discussion on Page 32.
C JFE (June 2006)
(Omitting paper summary. Rest is verbatim.)
1. This paper has many problems. Perhaps the most severe is exposition. While reading it, I guessed
the paper was written by a Ph.D. candidate who had been buﬀeted by a big and overactive disser-
tation committee. The four referee reports appended to the paper suggest I was not too far oﬀ.
The result is a paper that lacks a simple, coherent structure or logic. At several points, I found
myself wishing the authors would just get on with it.
The writing author has been trying, at least since 1987—apparently without much success.
2. For example, why are we subjected to almost a full page (6) discussion of how the LST and Ross
measures of CEFD are spliced? And despite the full page, we never learn why the two measures
diﬀer or, remarkably, how the two series are actually spliced! The next page (7) is a long discussion
of consumer conﬁdence that says little of consequence. A short paragraph of the new ideas would
be suﬃcient. Pages 8 and 9 provide excruciating detail about the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
Index. Again, the important facts could be summarized in one or two brief paragraphs. These are
four almost randomly chosen pages. I could make similar comments about many of the others.
This may be a matter of taste: We feel that explaining the details of splicing, and the surveys them-
selves is very important. The text is 27 pages, not overly long for a paper that has not converged with
one referee/journal.
3. More generally, the paper is repetitive, argumentative, and unfocused. The same ideas, arguments,
and conclusions keep reappearing throughout the paper. It leaves me with the impression the
authors think they are debating with a group particularly dull critics.
...and, worse, apparently without much success, either.
344. I do recognize the irony of criticizing the authors for reacting to referees, but in its current state
the paper should not be published so more feedback cannot make the authors worse oﬀ. Their
challenge is to constructively incorporate my comments and those of the other referees. The goal
is a succinct, logical paper that makes sense to a reader who has not participated in prior debates
about the subject with the authors.
(The other referees (and the next ones) are likely focused on the existing debate. They would probably
complain if the paper was not a direct reaction thereto.) We also believe our paper is logical, and at
27 pages of text, double-spaced, not excessively long.
5. I have at least two other substantive concerns. First, I think most behavioral ﬁnance types, includ-
ing LST, interpret investor sentiment to mean irrational beliefs. The authors clearly recognize this,
but they also recognize that investor beliefs about investment prospects can change for rational
reasons. These rational reasons include changes in expected cashﬂows and changes in expected
returns, which in turn might be caused by changes in risk or changes in risk aversion. (In the
spirit of my criticism above, a clear, succinct, and better organized discussion of this issue would
improve the paper.) The authors take a stab at disentangling the various "real" factors aﬀecting
consumer sentiment by projecting change in the Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence index on con-
temporaneous and future corporate proﬁts and aggregate consumption. They interpret the ﬁtted
values from these ﬁrst pass regressions as the part of the change in consumer conﬁdence due to
the real economy. The residual is the part that is not due to the real economy. They then use the
ﬁtted values and the residuals from these ﬁrst pass regressions to explain the small-big returns
spread and conclude that the two parts of the change in consumer conﬁdence contribute roughly
the same amount to the prediction of the return spread.
This test does not seem robust. There are at least two potential (and possibly oﬀ-setting) prob-
lems. The ﬁrst is functional form. If the relations between changes in consumer conﬁdence and
the macro variables are not linear, errors in the speciﬁcations will show up in the residuals and
bias the tests toward too much importance on the component that is not related to the economy.
The second problem arises because the ﬁrst pass projects changes in consumer conﬁdence on
future variables that we think are related to the dependent variable in the second pass. Except
for some pathological situations in the ﬁrst pass, we expect to ﬁnd a relation between the ﬁtted
values from the ﬁrst pass and the return spread in the second. To see the point, suppose we run
a univariate ﬁrst pass regression in which the independent variable is highly correlated with the
return spread, but essentially uncorrelated with changes in consumer conﬁdence. As long as the
ﬁrst pass slope is not identically zero, we will ﬁnd a strong relation in the second pass, even if
the t-statistic in the ﬁrst pass is trivially diﬀerent from zero.
[1] Functional form speciﬁcations can indeed cause an omitted variables problem. Similar require-
ments are unfortunately universal in any kinds of decompositions. We are unaware of any methods
to avoid this. [2] Your question is whether ﬁtted consumption conﬁdence changes are simply (linear)
future actual consumption or proﬁt changes (which therefore inﬂuence the return spread). If they
are, then this is ﬁne with us. It would be exactly the interpretation proposed by the rational camp.
6. Second, the authors overstate their results. For example, they argue that the CEFD "has lost it
contemporaneous explanatory power for the small stock return spread after 1985." The coeﬃcient
does fall by about two thirds, from 1.043 to 0.355, and the t-statistic falls from 5.21 to 1.58, but a
Bayesian would probably not conclude the coeﬃcient is now zero.
What can we say? Yes, we are interpreting a T-stat of 1.58 to be insigniﬁcant, even though a Bayesian
may not.
7. As another of many possible examples, on page 13 the authors write: "Therefore, we can conclude
that there is no diﬀerence in how poor and wealthy investor sentiment changes month-to-month.
Wealth is not a determinant of sentiment changes." (The italics, in the original, magnify the over-
statement.) This does not pass the smell test, let alone the Classical Statistics 101 question about
failure to reject versus accepting the null. Frequent overstatements such as these undermine the
reader’s faith in the authors’ objectivity.
We have about 60,000 investors. Under a null, the correlation between the two has a bootstrapped
83%. The empirical estimate sits at 80.4%, which is the 23rd percentile. I am not clear about your
critique: Should we believe that our failure to reject the NULL of generally equal perspectives to be
primarily an issue of low power within this large a set of data? Moreover, the diﬀerences seem surely
not related to wealth in an economically important fashion, either.
358. Some smaller comments: 1. Why does the sample period stop in 2002? I realize the authors have
been trying to place the paper in a journal for a while, but given the short sample period for some
of the critical data, the extra three years available since 2002 could improve the empirical tests a
lot.
We tried to get more, most recently in 2006, but this has not been possible.
D JF (< 2005) and General
1. (JF:) Please revise and resubmit, but make this more of a paper on consumer conﬁdence as a factor.
Thank you for the kind words and decision, but this is not the goal of our paper. We are interested in
sentiment. Consumer conﬁdence is a good-yet-noisy proxy from our perspective, and not the prime
focus in its own right.
The remaining FAQs are not based on referee comments:
1. Is this an economics or a ﬁnance paper?
Both. For economists, it is about the correlation between consumer conﬁdence and the overall stock
market. It also is related to DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), which is on noise
trader risk in ﬁnancial markets, published in the Journal of Political Economy.
2. Is this a behavioral ﬁnance or a classical ﬁnance paper?
Neither and both. It seeks to oﬀend equally.
3. We already have discarded the CEFD. We already knew this.
Really? It continues to be used and LST continues to be referenced.
4. Consumer conﬁdence is not a measure of conﬁdence. It is driven by macroeconomics.
CC is correlated with the UBS/Gallup direct measure. And, yes, investor sentiment should be driven
by macroeconomics and other variables. Sentiment does not fall like manna from heaven.
5. Your validation metrics are poor.
Our paper is not perfect. We agree that the validation metrics in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)
are problematic. We believe that our own validation metrics signiﬁcantly improve thereon: We have
direct validation with the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment measure.
6. Would a non-ﬁnding for CC in pricing small stocks have mattered?
It would not have mattered if CC were only a theoretical hypothesized measure. If the CEFD had
not worked in LST, a non-ﬁnding would have been uninteresting—we would have discounted the
interpretation of the CEFD as a proxy for sentiment. However, we do use the UBS/Gallup more direct
proxy for investor sentiment for validation. This makes even a ﬁnding of no measure and/or role of
investor sentiment interesting.
7. You are missing the common-factor cross-sectional tests in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991).
True. However, it is not clear what this adds. If rational discount factors have time-series variation,
then the PV of transaction costs would likely make funds’ CEFD covary, too.
8. You are missing the CEF initiation tests in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991).
Although no longer in the paper, we could not replicate the LST CEF opening evidence in the broader
SDC data base on the CEFD metric.
B Institutional vs. Retail Portfolio Construction
The institutional holding portfolios were formed from Thomson 13(f) data, starting in 1980. Stocks are
ranked using the holding data at the end of prior quarter; for example, January, February, and March groups
are formed according to holdings in the prior December last year. We do not have holding data for Dec.
1979, so we can not form deciles in Jan. and Feb. of 1980.
36Firms with zero institutional holdings are grouped into their own category; the remaining stocks are
grouped into deciles. The theory predicts higher explanatory power for stocks held primarily by retail
investors and not very liquidly traded. Thus, retailstocks.xret is constructed as follows:
Within each institutional holdings decile portfolio and within the zero-institutional holdings decile port-
folio, stocks are sorted by dollar trading volume. We then create one equal-weighted portfolio of the low-
trading volume zero-institutional holding stocks and one high-trading volume high-institutional holding
stock portfolio. The diﬀerence in returns is retailstocks.xret.18
18The unconditional spread is very high. This disappears if we value-weight the portfolios. However, our









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4142Table 3: The Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) Validation Metric:
Sentiment Correlation With the Return Spread of
Small Minus Large Firm Deciles
Data constant d.bullish.mich d.bullish.cefd.ew sp500.pctchg
full sample Coeﬃcient: 0.876 0.402 0.734 −0.059
df= 445, R
2
= 7.7% T-statistic: 2.66** 3.89*** 4.85** −0.78
pre-1985 Coeﬃcient: 1.297 0.457 1.043 0.250
df= 229, R
2
= 14.6% T-statistic: 2.70** 2.72** 5.21** 2.21*
post-1985 Coeﬃcient: 0.486 0.367 0.355 −0.297
df= 212, R
2
= 6.5% T-statistic: 1.15 3.06** 1.58 −3.14**
Excluding January Observations
Data constant d.bullish.mich d.bullish.cefd.ew sp500.pctchg
full sample Coeﬃcient: −0.097 0.369 0.172 −0.105
df= 408, R
2
= 4.1% T-statistic: −0.35 4.23*** 1.28 −1.66
pre-1985 Coeﬃcient: 0.213 0.418 0.359 0.127
df= 210, R
2
= 5.0% T-statistic: 0.51 2.80** 1.92 1.26
post-1985 Coeﬃcient: −0.368 0.333 0.049 −0.288
df= 194, R
2
= 9.2% T-statistic: −1.08 3.45*** 0.26 −3.76***
Description: The dependent variable, smallstocks.retspread, is the monthly rate of return on the smallest
decile of ﬁrms minus that of the largest decile of ﬁrms. d.bullish.mich is the change in the Michigan con-
sumer sentiment index. d.bullish.cefd.ew is the decrease in the equal-weighted closed-end fund discount.
sp500.pctchg is the percent change in the S&P500 index, and basically is in the regression as a market-model
control. Because the dependent variable is a spread, it is not highly correlated with the S&P500 change, either.
Signiﬁcance Levels: * = 5%, **= 1%, ***= 0.1%.
The ﬁrst row of each regression prints the plain OLS coeﬃcient, the second row prints the standardized
coeﬃcient (both dependent and independent variables are normalized to a mean of 0 and a standard devi-
ation of 1). The third row prints the t-statistic. One star (two stars) denote signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level,
two-sided. The return series are available from 1965/01 to 2003/12. Their univariate characteristics are:
Variable Mean Sdv Min Q1 Median Q3 Max ρ #obs
smallstocks.xret, in % 0.885 7.10 −20.62 −3.18 −0.03 3.25 42.92 11 468
sp500.pctchg, in % 0.642 4.39 −21.76 −1.90 0.79 3.63 16.30 1 471
43Table 4: Quarterly Data, Correlations with Real Economic Performance (SA), Full Sample
Regression
Panel A: Decomposing Changes in Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence
Model Variable (Changes in) Constant Lags Contemp Lead-1Q Lead-2Q Lead-3Q Lead-4Q
* Corporate Proﬁts Lags generally
not signiﬁcant
1 Corporate Proﬁts −0.353 38.091
T-statistic −0.85 5.01***
2 Corporate Proﬁts −0.533 36.611 10.999 8.503 5.047
T-statistic −1.26 4.80*** 1.44 1.12 0.67
Consumption Lags generally
T-statistic not signiﬁcant
3 Consumption −1.187 131.535
T-statistic −1.69 2.08*
4 Consumption −2.653 82.812 128.605 147.949 −57.761
T-statistic −2.87** 1.26 1.96 2.25* −0.86*
5 Consumption −2.895 121.589 143.349 −64.530 132.392
T-statistic −3.13** 1.87 2.20* −0.97 1.98*
Consumption:
−1.462
−29.508 111.446 129.153 −94.873
6 Both{
−1.35
−0.43 1.64 1.89 −1.34
Proﬁts: 36.304 5.072 1.215 8.145
4.37*** 0.61 0.15 0.98
* Models With Both: Close lags and next few leads are not signiﬁcant.
Panel B: Explaining the Quarterly Size-Decile Return Spread
constant d.bullish.cefd.ew sp500.ret d.mich.bus.umich
Base 2.952 1.367 0.065 0.943
T-statistic 2.52* 3.47*** 0.43 4.09***
CC Decom- d.bullish.mich.cc
position constant d.bullish.cefd.ew sp500.ret due to economy not economy related
Model 1 2.962 1.362 0.070 1.191 0.899
T-statistic 2.52* 3.45*** 0.46 2.16* 3.64***
Model 2 2.979 1.369 0.064 1.211 0.890
T-statistic 2.53* 3.47*** 0.42 2.34* 3.59***
Model 3 3.110 1.446 0.072 3.840 0.849
T-statistic 2.69** 3.72*** 0.48 3.14** 3.69***
Model 4 3.056 1.383 0.038 1.422 0.908
T-statistic 2.58* 3.50*** 0.24 1.91 3.84***
Model 5 2.951 1.367 0.065 0.942 0.943
T-statistic 2.49* 3.46*** 0.41 1.37 3.96***
Model 6 2.957 1.367 0.064 0.970 0.936
T-statistic 2.51* 3.46*** 0.42 2.03* 3.72***
Description: The dependent variable in Panel A, the ﬁrst stage regression, is the quarterly change in the
Michigan Consumer Conﬁdence Index, d.bullish.mich.cc. There are 147 degrees of freedom in these regres-
sions. Model 6 reaches an R
2
of 16.4%. The dependent variable in Panel B is the quarterly return spread
between size decile 1 and size decile 10 stocks. d.bullish.cefd.ew is signiﬁcant only because this is the
full-sample regression; post-1985 or without Januaries, it is not. “Due to economy” is the ﬁtted value from
the Panel A model, as indicated in the left-most column, “not economy-related” is the residual. There are
144 degrees of freedom in these models. Model 6 reaches an R
2
= 18%. Signiﬁcance Levels: * = 5%, ** = 1%,
***= 0.1%.
4546Table 5: Adding CEO Conﬁdence Measures with Quarterly Data
Panel A: Business Conﬁdence Correlation
Corr d.bullish.gallup.all with d.bullish.mich.cc 73.0% 3.85**
Corr d.bullish.gallup.all with d.bullish.cefd.ew −1.9% −0.07
Corr d.ceo.conf with d.bullish.mich.cc 42.1% 4.85***
Corr d.ceo.conf with d.gallup.all 27.1% 1.02
Corr d.ceo.conf with d.bullish.cefd.ew −26.9% −2.85**
Corr d.ceo.exp with d.bullish.mich.cc 41.9% 4.82**
Corr d.ceo.exp with d.gallup.all 29.7% 1.12
Corr d.ceo.exp with d.bullish.cefd.ew −29.0% −3.10**
Panel B: The Sentiment Correlation With the Return Spread of Small Minus Large Firm Deciles,
Adding Contemporaneous CEO Conﬁdence.
Full Sample 1985-
Intercept 2.952 2.52* 2.618 2.45* 2.591 2.42* 1.881 1.44
d.bullish.mich.cc 0.943 4.09*** 0.978 4.82*** 0.979 4.80*** 0.933 3.77***
d.bullish.cefd.ew 1.367 3.47*** 0.206 0.48 0.207 0.48 0.445 0.88
sp500.ret 0.065 0.43 −0.309 −2.17* −0.303 −2.11* −0.397 −2.41*
d.ceo.exp 0.393 2.46* 0.597 1.41 1.296 2.31*
d.ceo.conf −0.197 −0.48 −0.754 −1.34
Description: In Panel A, correlations are based on 15 quarterly observations when the Gallup variable is
involved, and on 111 and on 106 quarterly observations otherwise (for the CC and CEFD, respectively). In
Panel B, the dependent variable is the size extreme deciles return spread. The adjusted R
2
is 28% in the two
left panels, 31.3% in the right panel. Signiﬁcance Levels: * = 5%, **= 1%, ***= 0.1%. Univariate statistics are as
follows:
Variable Mean Sdv Min Q1 Median Q3 Max ρ Range #obs
smallstocks.xret 2.375 13.1 −23.68 −6.18 −0.23 9.90 55.87 −13 1965/Q2 2003/Q4 112
d.bullish.mich.cc 0.152 5.98 −15.5 −3.80 0.80 3.20 22.20 −20 1965/Q4 2004/Q1 113
d.bullish.cefd.ew −0.079 2.46 −6.20 −1.67 −0.18 1.39 8.18 −14 1965/Q4 2002/Q4 108
sp500.ret 2.567 7.86 −23.2 −1.26 2.49 7.54 20.87 0 1965/Q2 2004/Q1 113
d.ceo.conf −0.162 7.00 −16.0 −5.00 −0.33 4.00 26 −7 1976/Q2 2005/Q4 118
d.exp.econ −0.156 7.13 −14.0 −4.55 −1.00 4.00 29 −8 1976/Q2 2005/Q4 118
4748Figure 1: Time-Series of Sentiment Measures























































Negative of CEFD (bullish.cefd)
Ross Data
LST Data




























Michigan CC Changes (d12.bullish.mich)













































Negative of CEFD Changes (d12.bullish.cefd)
Ross Data
LST Data
Description: These ﬁgures are based on annual data. The levels are representative of the monthly levels,
but changes are not. Our results are statistically less signiﬁcant, but most of them tend to be similar, if we
use annual data.
4950